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THE CORPORATE VENTURE DYAD: A STUDY OF THE IMPACT OF CULTURAL 
DISTANCE ON VENTURE PERFORMANCE 
Tommie R. Welcher 
October 15, 2020 
 Even though corporate ventures (CVs) provide many benefits to established 
corporations, they continue to fail at a high rate.  Whereas research supports that a 
corporation can gain a parenting advantage over its competitors (Campbell et al., 1995), 
there is no evidence to support that starting more CVs leads to more successful CVs.  
Parenting advantage theory postulates that if a corporation with a parenting advantage 
starts a venture then that venture will be more successful than if any of their competitors 
had started the same venture (Campbell et al., 1995).   CVs are typified by dynamism and 
innovation, but established corporations have a duty to maximize shareholder returns 
while minimizing risks (Simon et al., 1999).  The divergence of these two cultures can 
create cultural friction at the interface of the interacting corporate and venture managers.  
I analyzed these relationships to understand what impact cultural distance could have on 
CV performance.  I found that an increase in corporate cultural distance is associated 
with a decrease in venture success.  My findings suggest that even though a corporation 
may possess resources that could benefit its venture, that cultural distance between a 
parent and its venture could be inhibiting the transfer of these resources to its venture 
leading to lower levels of venture success.   
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 
Corporate Ventures are a form of entrepreneurship in which a corporation creates 
or acquires a wholly-owned new business and then allows it to operate independently of 
its parent (Kuratko et al. 2015).  Corporate ventures (CVs) are an attractive option for 
established firms desiring to grow or diversify (Garrett & Neubaum, 2013).  Research 
shows that CVs have evolved over the past 40 years beyond their early role of developing 
value-creating innovations (Schollhammer, 1982).  Other scholars have proposed CVs are 
now being utilized as vehicles through which corporations can gain knowledge (McGrath 
et al., 1994), achieve international success (Birkinshaw, 1997), and learn to configure 
resources innovatively to develop a competitive advantage (Kuratko et al., 2009).  
Scholars show that established corporations have three primary goals when starting CVs: 
1) to increase the innovative capability of a firm; 2) to realize greater value from a 
parent’s existing skills and resources by cultivating new knowledge in areas of strategic 
importance; and 3) to quickly generate financial returns (Miles & Covin, 2002).   
An underdeveloped but promising theory explaining the success some 
corporations can cultivate in corporate ventures is the parenting advantage.  The 
parenting advantage is the amount of success that a CV achieves because of the 
particular corporate parent,  it has and the amount of support it receives from that parent 
corporation (Campbell et al., 1995).  This theory goes on to state that if a corporation has 
a parenting advantage its ventures will perform better than it would if it had a different 
2 
 
corporate parent (Campbell et al., 1995).  Thus, a parent corporation that can provide its 
ventures with more support and create more successful ventures has a parenting 
advantage over its competitors (Campbell et al., 1995).  Further development of the 
theory has found that a corporation can obtain the parenting advantage in multiple ways; 
by providing complementary skills that a CV may not possess (Campbell et al., 1995), by 
providing market-specific expertise due to market relatedness of a venture (Garrett & 
Covin, 2015), by providing specific resources to the endowment of a venture (Garrett & 
Neubaum, 2013), or by providing specific knowledge that can benefit a venture 
(Tanriverdi & Venkatraman, 2005).  Although this theoretical lens provides valuable 
insights into how a corporation can create successful CVs by providing them with 
support, it fails to consider the impact relationship factors between a CV and corporate 
parent may have on the corporation’s transfer of support and eventual venture success.   
We know that a parent corporation can obtain the parenting advantage and be 
more successful with its corporate ventures than its competitors by providing 
complementary skills and resources that a venture may not possess (Campbell et al., 
1995).  However, this theory currently hasn’t been developed beyond this point, and we 
do not yet understand how the relationship between a parent and a venture can impact the 
transfer of beneficial resources from parent to venture.  There could be characteristics of 
the relationship that inhibit the ability of a parent corporation to transfer the level of 
needed support to a venture.  The theory to this point provides that a venture provides a 
parenting opportunity if a business can be improved beyond its current state (Campbell et 
al., 1995).  We also know that a corporation can realize this opportunity if it possesses 
skills or resources that can improve the business (Campbell et al., 1995).  An important 
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assumption of the theory is that if a corporation has the complementary resources and a 
parenting advantage exists with a venture, it will transfer the beneficial resources and 
realize the parenting advantage.  This assumption ignores the possibility that a parenting 
opportunity exists but that a corporation possessing beneficial resources is unable to 
transfer them to a venture.  Expanding the theory to include how aspects of the 
relationship between two companies can inhibit the transfer of resources will further 
develop the theory.   
A more holistic understanding of what factors can inhibit a corporation from 
transferring the parenting advantage to its ventures will allow us not only to understand 
why some corporations are more successful at venturing activities than others, but also 
why some ventures of a particular parent are more successful than their sibling ventures.  
Beyond the development of theory, there is a very practical reason to increase our 
understanding of how and why CVs fail or succeed.  Corporations are engaging in 
venturing activities with purpose, and whereas, research supports venturing being a 
popular activity for corporations trying to grow, CVs continue to have very high failure 
rates (Hanan, 1976; Garrett & Neubaum, 2013).  A more developed understanding of 
why and how CVs fail or succeed can provide coachable insights to help corporations 
more successfully start new ventures.   
To bridge this gap in theory and increase our understanding of what leads to 
venture success, I am adding the concept of cultural distance to the theoretical lens of 
parenting advantage.  This motivates my primary research question which is:  
Research Question 1: What is the impact of cultural distance on the 
performance of a CV? 
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Varying levels of cultural distance between the parent corporation and its venture 
could be an aspect of the relationship that is impacting the ability of a parent corporation 
to transfer support to a venture.  Culture is a set of important assumptions that members 
of a group share (Sathe, 1985).  Research indicates that every corporate culture is unique 
and that it impacts its members (Schein, 1985).  Cultural distance is the extent to which 
different cultures are similar or different (Shenkar, 2001).  Corporate cultural distance is 
the amount of difference between two or more unique corporate cultures (Shenkar, 2001).  
In the management literature, cultural distance is shown to be a key antecedent of 
performance in relationships between culturally diverse corporations (Shenkar, 2001), 
including the performance of affiliated businesses (Black & Mendenhall, 1991).  For 
example, mergers and international joint ventures are like CVs in that they require 
multiple and diverse management teams to work together.  These popular modes of 
exploiting new markets are shown to have failure rates as high as 70% (Christensen et al., 
2011; Lowen & Pope, 2008).  Research into the area has found that cultural distance 
significantly impacts the success that corporations engaging in these activities will 
achieve (Shenkar, 2001).    
The need to learn through experimentation creates a CV culture wherein mistakes 
are tolerable so long as employees are learning from them (Simon et al., 1999).  This 
willingness of a CV to learn through experimentation is in stark contrast to the stodgier 
character and bureaucratic policies typically associated with many large, established 
corporations (Simon et al., 1999).  Large corporations traditionally have a rigid hierarchy, 
which impedes the nimbleness needed to make quick, flexible decisions (Simon et al., 
1999).  CVs require a unique culture from a parent corporation which the venture 
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manager is responsible for developing (Shrader & Simon, 1997; Simon et al., 1999).  As 
an innovative firm, a CV’s need for flexibility will create cultural distance from a parent 
that could create cultural friction.      
Cultural friction is the amount of increase in resistance or animosity that can 
occur at the interface between interacting culturally different companies, which could 
increase the difficulty of communication, interaction, and information exchange 
(Shenkar, 2001, Luo & Shenkar, 2011).  This increase in the difficulty of interaction 
could worsen the relationship between the parties, as well as reduce the amount of 
information exchanged.  Research to this point has not considered what impact cultural 
distance between an established corporation and its CV has on CV performance.  
However, the relationship between the two management teams impacts the potential 
benefits, if any, which will be transferred between an established corporation and its CV 
(Covin et al., 2016).  In this sense, an important consideration is that before such a 
relationship can flourish, and both parties benefit, they must be able to interact 
harmoniously. To this point, we don’t know what impact cultural distance from a parent 
corporation has on the success of a corporate venture. 
I focus on the corporate cultural distance between an established corporation and 
its newly formed CV.  When considering the impact of cultural distance, I consider that a 
culturally different CV may result in cultural friction occurring between the parent and its 
CV.  I consider if this increase in cultural friction can act to inhibit the transfer of 
beneficial resources that a venture can receive from its parent and alter the amount of 
success the venture ultimately finds.   
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Research shows that when a corporate parent creates a CV it is important to 
balance the autonomy of a CV with the amount of monitoring used to restrict a venture’s 
options (Simon et al., 1999; Garrett & Covin, 2015).  When lack of balance is considered 
in conjunction with starting more CVs over time, especially when their performance is 
disappointing (Kuratko et al.,2009), it becomes increasingly apparent that a parent has an 
internal shortcoming leading to failure, perhaps serially, at corporate venturing activities.   
The cultural distance between a CV and its parent corporation, as well as the friction it 
creates, could lead to a lack of beneficial resources being transferred from the parent 
corporation and/or received by the venture.  The additional strain of this could eventually 
lead to a dysfunctional relationship.  I consider the impact of the congruence of 
perceptions and culture on the success of a CV.  The theoretical lens that captures the 
importance of beneficial resource exchange between a parent corporation and its ventures 
is the parenting advantage perspective.  The ability of a firm to overcome a strained 
relationship and receive the resources from a parent corporation is incorporated within 
the constructs of absorptive capacity and turbulence.  This dissertation considers the 
relationship between cultural distance and performance as moderated by absorptive 
capacity and turbulence.  
The Impact of Absorptive Capacity on the Relationship Between Cultural 
Distance and the Performance of a CV 
Absorptive Capacity is the corporate capacity to utilize external knowledge during 
the successive learning processes; 1.) exploration, 2.) transformation, and 3.) exploitation 
(Lane et al., 2006; Lichtenthaler, 2009).  Research shows that absorptive capacity is the 
aggregation of this learning process through which a corporation derives its ability to 
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obtain, assimilate, and stockpile knowledge (Lane et al., 2006). In the relationship 
between the CV and parent corporation, having cultural distance may provide an 
opportunity for the venture to learn from their parent (March, 1991) while altering their 
culture to include new processes and structures (Kuratko & Audretsch, 2013).  The level 
to which the venture management team can acquire and incorporate information from the 
parent could impact the extent to which its venture is able to benefit from the parenting 
advantage the parent corporation has to offer.  Research into the area suggests that the 
amount of information exchanged is positively correlated with better firm performance 
(Kuratko et al., 2009). 
The Impact of Turbulence on the Relationship Between Cultural Distance and 
the Performance of a CV 
 Turbulence is the combination of; 1.) the extent to which the composition and 
preferences of a corporation’s customers change over time, 2.) the behavior, resources, 
ability of competitors to differentiate; as well as 3.) the extent to which technology in an 
industry is in a state of flux (Jaworski & Kohli, 1993).  Research shows that during times 
of high environmental turbulence, corporations are more likely to seek out innovative 
opportunities (Kuratko et al., 2014b).  The level of turbulence could impact the extent to 
which venture managers are open to and/or actively seek out the opportunity to gain 
information from their corporate parent.  These varying levels of turbulence could lead to 
a change in feeling the “need” to learn and change by upper management.  A change in 
felt-need by management to gain and disseminate new knowledge may alter the amount 
of change through nurturing a parent makes on the processes and structures of a venture.  
Whereas, learning occurs at the individual level, for the learning to change processes and 
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structures, which are engrained in culture, the learning has to pass from management 
through the corporation (March, 1991).  Under pressure for a venture to perform and with 
the added stress of environmental turbulence, managers may be more aggressive in trying 
to gain new knowledge and more proactive in distributing this learned knowledge 
through the ranks of a venture.   
The Impact of Perceived Cultural Distance Congruence on the Relationship 
Between Cultural Distance and CV Performance 
 The unique perceptions of a manager impact his or her views of success (Bantel, 
1998), and the strain created by cultural distance is shown to be a key contributor to 
success (Shenkar, 2001).  In the instance of a CV, this strain can occur due a lack of 
congruence between a CV manager and the manager of the parent corporation.  A strain 
between the nuanced aspects of personal relationships between a parent corporation and a 
CV can lead to difficulties in nurturing a CV (Sherman, 1992).  Congruence of 
perceptions of cultural distance between the managers of a parent corporation and a CV, 
independent of the amount of cultural distance, could alter the way the two sides 






 The primary intended contribution of this dissertation is to further develop the 
perspective of parenting advantage.  Although it shows parenting is a way corporations 
can more successfully start ventures by nurturing these ventures and providing their 
venture offspring with complementary resources and skills (Campbell et al., 1995), it has 
not been developed extensively past this point.  A goal of this research is to develop the 
parenting advantage perspective beyond its current considerations.  In this research, I 
attempt to extend the perspective past thinking in terms of solely whether a corporation is 
a good or bad parent or does that corporation have complementary resources with which 
to properly nurture its ventures.  This research considers what seems a more likely option 
that all corporate parents have some amount of complementary resources or advantages 
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they can offer to their ventures, but there is some aspect of the relationship between the 
parent and child that is inhibiting this nurturing from being transferred from the parent to 
child.  I do this by considering the impact of cultural distance between a parent and its 
venture which has been correlated with negative child outcomes between culturally 
distant human parents and their children (Kim et al., 2006; Tseng & Fuligni, 2000).   
Although the body of CV research has provided many insights, scholars continue 
to cite the same problem of high failure rates with CVs (Hanan, 1976; Lowen & Pope, 
2008).  The relationship between corporate and venture managers is essential to the 
success of a CV (Sherman, 1992).  However, studying this relationship has proved to be 
difficult.  A goal of this research is to better understand the relationship between the two 
managers and what impact cultural distance has on this relationship.  By understanding 
the impact of cultural distance, I hope to determine to what extent an increase in cultural 
distance and friction has on the amount of success a venture can have.  If the reason a 
venture is unable to receive the optimum level of nurturing from its parent corporation is 
friction inhibiting the transfer process, it is coachable and a problem that can be 
overcome. 
 A better understanding of this relationship will make both theoretical and 
practical contributions.  This research focuses on the relationship and/or relational strain 
between corporate and venture managers, which is an aspect of venturing activities that 
managers can be coached on and improve.  Advancing the understanding of how cultural 
distance can impact the relationship between a parent and CV managers and eventually 
on venture success will provide an opportunity to improve CV success rates.  The 
relationship between the two managers is paramount in the success yet the intricacies that 
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lead to the success or failure of the relationships are not well understood.  The practical 
contribution is that a better understanding of this relationship will allow us as scholars 
and educators to make more cogent recommendations to current and future executives 
that will be charged with the success of future CVs.  The ultimate goal is that this 
research can lead to decreasing the failure rate of future CVs. 
This study will make contributions to corporate managers.  Research indicates 
that there is no link between the number of CVs a corporation previously started and the 
success they achieve through each CV (Kuratko et al., 2009).  This could imply that there 
are inherent characteristics of corporations that greatly impact their likelihood of 
launching successful CVs.  These characteristics and their nuances may be captured in 
corporate culture.  By providing managers with a better understanding of the impact of 
cultural distance as well as the congruence of distance perceptions between parent and 
CV managers, I can provide a basis for enacting change on parent corporation-CV 
relations.  Learning can come from someone outside the current corporate culture 
(March, 1991), and learning is shown to impact the level of success a CV obtains (Covin 
et al., 2016).  Also, learning by the parent corporation is a measure of the success of a CV 
(Keil et al., 2009).  Through increasing corporate managers’ understanding of the roles 
cultural distance and absorptive capacity have on performance, we may be able to foster 
an environment of understanding and increased information exchange between parent 
corporations and CVs.  
Cultural distance is one of the most considered constructs in international 
business research (Shenkar, 2012).  Despite CVs being used as vehicles through which 
corporations can achieve international success (Birkinshaw, 1997; Callaway, 2008), and 
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the widely accepted fact that large corporations and their CVs have different corporate 
cultures (Simon et al., 1999; Garrett & Covin, 2015), it has yet to be included in the CV 
literature.  This study uses multiple measurement methods to determine the cultural 
distance between parent corporations and their CVs and the impact that this distance has 
on CV performance.  By including international data,  I hope to further increase the 
generalizability of this study.  
A common complaint within the CV literature is that there is a failure to use 
multiple sources of data and limited alignment with major theoretical streams (Ireland & 
Webb, 2007; Hill & Georgoulas, 2016).  This study will contribute to overcoming this 
challenge in multiple ways.  First, this study aligns with major theoretical streams by 
including variables of cultural distance and absorptive capacity.  Absorptive capacity is a 
construct of interest when considering a relationship between two culturally diverse 
corporations (Bjorkman et al., 2007).  The relationship between a CV and parent 
corporation is a complex relationship between two culturally diverse companies, yet the 
impact of absorptive capacity on the performance of CVs has not been heavily explored.  
This study will advance the current literature through both improving our understanding 
of the relationship between absorptive capacity and performance, and also how 








CHAPTER II: LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
Literature Review 
 In this chapter, I provide a review of the pertinent literature and later develop the 
hypotheses of this study.  I organize the literature review into four subsections: the 
foundation of CV research, learning and CVs, internationalization and CVs, and the 
antecedents of CV success.  The foundations of CV research include some of the earliest 
and most influential work into corporate venturing.  Because the scope of this project is 
international, I review the literature of CVs being used to enter international markets.  
Also, I introduce in this study cultural components and cultural distance as antecedents to 
CV success.  I review the antecedents other scholars have proposed and studied as 
predictors of CV performance.  
Foundation of CV Research 
 Corporations, in part, use CVs as a way to diversify (Schollhammer, 1982).  
Acquisitions have long been thought to be a good option for diversification 
(Schollhammer, 1982).  However, high failure rates and complications with antitrust laws 
led corporations to explore other means to diversify (Adams, 1969; Hanan, 1976).  Early 
CVs also had unsatisfactory results, with many of the early movers having nothing to 
show for their efforts and then canceling all their venturing activities (Hanan, 1976).  It 
was also found that CVs were subject to early termination even though studies showed a 
CV on average required eight years to prove its worth (Burgerdike, 1979).  From 
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interviews with corporate managers, researchers ascertained that part of this problem was 
due to CVs being treated like smaller multinational firms with the same departments and 
resource allocation structure (Hanan, 1976).  Researchers have determined that major 
corporations are not natural habitats for entrepreneurial activities and that CVs need to be 
treated more like start-ups than smaller clones of major corporations (Hanan, 1976).  The 
bureaucratic conditions that exist in many large corporations create a hostile environment 
for innovation (Hlavecek & Thompson, 1978).  Major corporations operate under a very 
rigid business plan, which works well for established businesses, but CVs need room to 
be flexible and adapt to the environment to be able to succeed (Hanan, 1976, Honig & 
Karlsson, 2004).  CVs were found to need a different style of manager, organization, and 
objective structure than its large parent corporation (Hanan, 1976).  The conclusion that a 
CV needs a different type of manager formed the basis of modern CV research.  While a 
CV can be useful for a large corporation, it can also be difficult to implement.  The 
difficulty of implementing a CV is due in part to the CV needing to be so different from 
the parent corporation yet still overseen by a parent who may not fully understand a CV’s 
needs (Fast, 1979; Garrett & Neubaum, 2013).  
 Further research suggested that the involvement of parent corporation 
management could have a significant impact on the success that a CV ultimately achieves 
(MacMillan & George, 1985).  Earlier research had indicated that a primary cause of 
failure with CVs was the frequent interference of parent corporation managers 
(Burgelman, 1983).  While later research concurred that interference could increase 
failure rates of CVs, studies also found that total neglect had similarly negative results 
(MacMillan & George, 1985).  It was determined that parent corporation management 
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faced the difficult challenge of balancing the amount of management and oversight they 
provided to the CV (MacMillan & George, 1985).  Researchers also determined that 
parent corporations needed to understand the amount of support a CV would need in 
order to have an opportunity to succeed (MacMillan & George, 1985).   
Learning and CVs 
 Although the majority of CV research has focused on business growth and 
financial performance, it has been suggested that a primary role of a CV is to provide a 
vehicle through which an existing corporation can generate new abilities and knowledge 
(Keil et al., 2009).  Further research from Keil et al. (2009) suggested that failure is part 
of the natural lifecycle of ventures and that the benefits corporations can garnish from 
CVs are not correlated with the CV’s market success.  This research focuses on the 
learning that occurs at the level of the parent corporation.  Other scholars have focused on 
how learning impacts the survivability of a CV (Gupta et al., 2006; Hill & Birkinshaw, 
2014).  The learning process is not simple; it involves many nuances and complexities.  A 
CV may be engaging in learning activities to develop its own new market knowledge 
(Gupta et al., 2006).  This knowledge can then be assimilated and utilized through the 
learning activities of the parent corporation (Gupta et al., 2006).  Learning is not 
inherently a trait of a corporation, but rather a function of individuals.  Within a CV it 
may be necessary to have different types of people or skills to obtain the proper level of 
balance among learning activities (Gupta et al., 2006). 
 Recent research has extended this work into learning by considering the extent to 
which ambidexterity between learning activities leads to the ability of a CV to endure 
(Hill & Birkinshaw, 2014).  Whereas the primary responsibility of a CV may be to 
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provide new opportunities for the parent corporation, the CV is also responsible for 
utilizing the existing resources of the parent corporation to make advancements more 
effectively (Hill & Birkinshaw, 2014).  Also, a CV should find ways to exploit its 
investments to benefit the parent firm (Hill & Birkinshaw, 2014).  This research also 
found that the survivability of a CV was reliant on multiple antecedents, including the 
ability of the CV to use the parent corporation’s existing capabilities to develop new 
capabilities and the extent to which the CV could integrate its activities with other units 
within the corporation (Hill & Birkinshaw, 2014).  The ability of a CV to coordinate its 
activities with the activities of both a parent corporation and other CVs greatly increases 
the likelihood that a CV endures and has an ongoing role with its parent corporation (Hill 
& Birkinshaw, 2014).  The irony is, that although CVs are often seen as a way for parent 
corporations to improve their ambidexterity, it may very well be balanced ambidexterity 
that leads to the survivability of CVs (Hill & Birkinshaw, 2014). 
CVs as a way to Enter International Markets 
Multinational enterprises often desire to spread their costs over large customer 
bases (Hitt et al., 2006).  This desire can drive multinationals to take current product 
offerings and expand them into new markets.  One method of entering new markets is for 
corporations to establish global ventures, which are CVs started specifically to enter a 
new international market (Callaway, 2008).  Although corporations may prefer to enter 
international markets slowly, global competition can necessitate that they enter more 
quickly.  More often firms are pressured to expand their markets internationally early in 
their history to remain competitive (Oviatt and McDougall, 1994).  CVs require a 
different culture from their parent corporations. Similarly, companies entering a new 
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international market may require a different culture to succeed than the parent 
corporation.  The usage of CVs to enter new international markets may provide 
established corporations a vehicle through which to access these markets which is more 
adaptable than the established corporation (Callaway, 2008).  Likewise, a CV has the 
advantage of the parent corporation’s established resources to help facilitate its entry into 
the new market (Callaway, 2008).     
Antecedents of Success 
 Research into CVs has identified several antecedents and correlates indicating the 
success of a CV.  Uncommitted financial resources and opportunities within a parent 
corporation’s core business are associated with more successful CVs (Kuratko et al., 
2009).  Research stipulates that when opportunities lay within the purview of a parent 
corporation’s core businesses the parent was less likely to engage in counterproductive 
meddling which helped the CV to be more successful (Kuratko et al., 2009).  Operating 
within a market or product that is adjacent to that of the parent corporation has long been 
regarded as an antecedent to CV success (Thornhill & Amit, 2001; Hill & Birkinshaw, 
2008).  However, empirical research has found very little support that product similarity 
and market familiarity are associated with the survivability of a CV (Kuratko et al., 
2009).  The degree to which a CV was a planned strategic initiative was shown to 
positively impact the success of a CV (Kuratko et al., 2009).  It was stipulated that this 
could be due to a parent corporation viewing a strategically planned CV as more 
legitimate and more adequately providing the necessary funding for such ventures 
(Kuratko et al., 2009). 
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 The literature to this point has continued to support that the degree to which the 
CV has the support of the top management of its parent corporation is a key factor in CV 
success (Shrader & Simon, 1997; Kuratko et al., 2005; Kuratko et al., 2009).  The natural 
turnover of upper-level management and the lifecycles of a new investment venture can 
unfortunately often lead to a lack of needed support.  Research has found that the average 
cycle of change for a corporation’s CEO is six years (Kaplan & Minton, 2006) and that 
the average start-up investment will not show a positive yield until year seven or eight 
(Gompers & Lerner, 1998, 2001).  Clear communication of the goals and value 
propositions for a CV from parent company managers to CV managers has a high 
correlation with venture performance (Kuratko et al., 2009; Covin et al. 2016).   
 Early research into the topic determined there was a strong correlation between 
CV performance and operational relatedness with a parent corporation (Sorrentino & 
Williams, 1995).  Since then, empirical work on the topic has found that CV 
organizational autonomy from the parent corporation is correlated with better CV 
financial performance (Hill et al., 2009; Kuratko et al., 2009).  It has been found that 
higher levels of venture specific knowledge by parent corporation management and 
general managerial skills are positively correlated with better CV performance (Kuratko 
et al., 2009; Riley et al., 2009).  Unsurprisingly, both the parent corporation possessing 
the strategic resources necessary for success in the CV’s business and providing the CV 
with a sufficient initial endowment of these strategic resources has been correlated with 
better CV performance (Kuratko et al., 2009).  To this point, research has found a 
negative impact of both environmental hostility and dynamism on the performance of a 




 The parenting advantage was developed as a method for corporations to decide 
the fit of a potential new venture for them by evaluating if they have a parenting 
advantage with that business (Campbell et al., 1995).  The theory states that if a 
corporation has a parenting advantage over its competitors then they will create more 
value for a particular venture than if any of their competitors created the same venture 
(Campbell et al., 1995).  For a parent corporation to have a parenting advantage the 
venture has to provide them with a parenting opportunity, signifying that there is room 
for the venture to be improved (Campbell et al., 1995).  The parent corporation is then 
able to gain a parenting advantage if a parenting opportunity exists and they have 
complementary resources or skills with which they can share with the venture to improve 
it (Campbell et al., 1995).  This research has been extended over the past several years.  
The parenting advantage has been applied to the parent corporation providing 
complementary assets to a firm enabling the increase in technological developments 
(King et al., 2003).  Beyond just having complementary skills and resources to provide to 
a venture, research has also found that a corporate parent can achieve a parenting 
advantage through the initial strategic asset endowment that they provide to the venture 
(Garrett & Neubaum, 2013).  The amount of parenting advantage a parent corporation 
has was also argued to be impacted by the amount of embeddedness that the venture and 
corporate parent share in the same network (Nell & Ambos, 2013).   
Development of Hypotheses 
Corporate Cultural Distance 
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 The parenting advantage has become a popular perspective to explain the success 
that a corporation has creating new ventures (Campbell et al., 1995; Nippa et al., 2011).  
The perspective of parenting advantage states that a venture can receive nurturing from a 
parent corporation (Campbell et al., 1995).  Some parent corporations have a parenting 
advantage, whereby the best parent corporations will create more value for a venture than 
if any of their rivals owned the same business (Campbell et al., 1995).  This perspective 
includes the corporation providing complementary services or resources to a venture that 
the venture may not possess (Campbell et al., 1995).  However, there is more to parenting 
than just having resources that can benefit your offspring.  Equally important is that you 
be able to transfer these resources that you have to your offspring for them to receive the 
benefit of having a good parent. 
 Further research into corporate venturing shows that there is no correlation 
between a corporation starting more ventures and a corporation starting more successful 
ventures (Kuratko et al., 2009).  This, in conjunction with the parenting advantage 
perspective, can be interpreted in multiple ways.  I have interpreted the work of Kuratko 
et al. (2009) that venturing is difficult, and each individual venture presents a unique 
corporation-CV culture dyad.  For this reason, it is difficult to learn from one venture and 
apply that learning to future ventures.  My interpretation, from these two streams, is that 
most if not all corporations have some knowledge or resources to offer their ventures.  
However, in some parent venture relationships, something is inhibiting the parent from 
transferring their advantage to their offspring.  Cultural distance between a parent 
corporation and their venture could be one factor that is impacting the ability of a parent 
corporation to transfer the resources they have to their ventures.  Cultural distance has 
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been shown to create cultural friction between two culturally different interacting parties 
(Shenkar, 2001).  A corporation starting a new CV is acting both as a parent and a 
business having interactions with a culturally different business.  Cultural distance is 
shown in business research to impact the success of the relationship between two 
culturally different businesses (Shenkar, 2001).  Also, social research into the parenting 
paradigm in humans shows that cultural distance between a parent and child is correlated 
with negative child outcomes (Kim et al., 2006; Tseng & Fuligni, 2000). 
CVs are a popular option for established corporations to exploit a myriad of 
potential opportunities (Garrett & Neubaum, 2013).  The necessity of a CV to be 
innovative and learn through failure sets the culture of a CV apart from that of an 
established corporation.  The typical established corporate cultural structure, including 
well-defined boundaries and rigid hierarchies, is not conducive to entrepreneurial efforts 
(Dess et al., 1999).  In stark contrast to this, firms that are entrepreneurial tend to exhibit 
characteristics of dynamism and flexibility and are prepared to capitalize on new 
opportunities when they arise (Kuratko et al. 2012).  For this reason, even though 
innovation and entrepreneurship are viewed as necessary strategies for firms competing 
in today’s marketplace, successful execution of CVs remains difficult for most 
corporations (Kuratko et al., 2014a).  CVs create a situation where the established 
corporation must delicately balance the entrepreneurial initiative’s need for independence 
with the corporation’s need to manage and mitigate costs and risks (Garrett & Covin, 
2014).  The stark contrast in corporate cultures that exist between established 
corporations and their entrepreneurial CVs necessitates the understanding of the impact 
cultural distance has on this delicate relationship. 
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 The need for a CV management team to tolerate failure in the name of learning 
and innovation is very much a different way of approaching business than that associated 
with established corporations.  The disparity between these two cultures is likely to create 
a level of friction between the two management teams.  This friction caused by different 
cultures could deteriorate and strain the relationship between the parent and CV.  A 
strained relationship could prove problematic as research has found that CVs need parent 
support to succeed (Kuratko et al., 2009), and that parent corporations can gain novel 
information from their CVs (Keil et al., 2009).  If the distance between the two corporate 
cultures is reducing the amount of information and resources that are being transmitted 
between a CV and parent corporation, then the distance will in turn create a situation 
where a CV performs poorly.  This poor performance would manifest both in terms of its 
own lower financial returns and survivability.  
 A common problem with cultural distance research is that cultural distance is 
measured from a single common culture to multiple different cultures (Brouthers et al., 
2016).  In the case of considering CVs, this would be equivalent to measuring only from 
the established corporations to the multiple cultures of its CVs.  This strategy ignores the 
perceived cultural distances from a CV to the established corporation.  This is 
problematic because it assumes symmetry when considering the measure of cultural 
distance.  Distance by definition is symmetric, and the assumption is that the distance 
from culture A to culture B is the same as the distance from culture B to culture A 
(Shenkar, 2001).  However, there are no studies showing this symmetry exists when 
considering cultural distance and there is no reason to assume that this symmetry exists 
(Shenkar, 2001).  This assumption of symmetry would imply that the distance from an 
23 
 
established corporation to a CV is the same as the distance from a CV to a corporation.  
This could be untrue in part because culture includes many nuances and is subject to the 
perceptions of both the corporate and joint venture managers.  To address the concern of 
asymmetry in cultural distance I propose hypotheses considering cultural distance from 
the perspective of both the corporate and venture manager, as well as a calculated 
measure of cultural distance which will assume symmetry in cultural distance.  To 
calculate the measure of cultural distance I will collect the corporate and CV manager’s 
perceptions of the culture for their own company and then calculate the absolute distance 
between the two cultures.   
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Hypothesis 1a: There is a negative relationship between the corporate 
manager’s perceived cultural distance and CV performance. 
Hypothesis 1b: There is a negative relationship between the CV 
manager’s perceived cultural distance and CV performance. 
Hypothesis 1c: There is a negative relationship between measured 
cultural distance and CV performance. 
Absorptive Capacity 
 If a venture is to receive advantages from its parent, not only does the parent have 
to be willing to nurture the venture, but also the venture will need to accept nurturing.  
Within the closed system of a corporation, over time the culture of the individuals and the 
organization will become a singular homogenous culture (March, 1991).  The culture can 
only change when acted upon by individuals whose culture deviates from that of the 
group (March, 1991).  The culture of the parent through parenting can act upon the 
venture and through the process transform the organizations and processes of the venture.  
This transformation of a corporation’s internal organizations can become what 
differentiates a venture from its competitors (Kuratko et al., 2015).  This could prove 
beneficial to the venture since successful corporate entrepreneurship can not only lead to 
innovation in product offerings and markets, but also in internal organizations such as 
processes and structures (Kuratko & Audretsch, 2013).   
 One potential benefit of cultural distance between a parent corporation and a 
corporate venture is the opportunity to gain information (March, 1991).  Since the parent 
will have a different culture and likely different knowledge, the opportunity exists for the 
parent corporation to transfer and augment the knowledge stockpile of the CV.  Research 
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has shown that corporations are relying on external knowledge to improve performance at 
an increasing rate (Ireland et al., 2002; Zollo et al., 2002).  Research shows that some 
firms can derive great benefit from external knowledge (Cassiman & Veugelers, 2006).  
Managerial relationships are shown to impact the amount of interfirm knowledge transfer 
that occurs (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990).  As a result of this constraint, the absorptive 
capacity of a corporation can become a competitive advantage for the corporation (Zahra 
& George, 2002). 
 Absorptive Capacity is the ability of a corporation to utilize external knowledge 
through the successive learning processes (Lane et al., 2006).  Learning is a multi-level 
process that consists of acquiring, assimilating, and retaining new information (Lane et 
al., 2006).  Exploratory learning is the process through which corporations acquire new 
external knowledge (Zahra & George, 2002).  Exploitative learning is the process 
through which the corporation assimilates external knowledge and applies it to the 
corporation’s specific markets (Lane et al., 2006; Lenox & King, 2004).  Transformative 
learning links exploitative and exploratory learning; it is the process of retaining acquired 
and assimilated knowledge over time (Lane et al., 2006).  The result of these learning 
processes, absorptive capacity, has been shown to have an impact greater than any 
individual learning component as they gain synergy from complementarity and balance 
(Lichtenthaler, 2009).   
The learning capabilities of managers are associated with better performance of 
CVs (Kuratko et al., 2009; Riley et al., 2009).  Because absorptive capacity is a 
representative measure of management’s ability to utilize each of the learning processes, 
it is an appropriate construct for this study.  The level of absorptive capacity that each CV 
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management team possesses could be indicative of the amount of nurturing that the CV 
will be able to receive from their corporate parent.  The presence of cultural distance 
between a CV and parent corporation could provide a prime opportunity for a venture to 
gain external knowledge.  The amount of absorptive capacity of the venture could impact 
to what degree the venture will be able to capitalize on this opportunity and gain benefit 
from its parent’s knowledge.  Also, the absorptive capacity of the CV could be indicative 
of whether the CV will abstain from assimilating to the parent corporation’s culture and 
continue to resist the opportunity to learn and incorporate cultural change from their 
parent.  As such the amount of absorptive capacity a venture has will moderate the impact 
cultural distance from the parent has on the success outcomes of the venture.    
Hypothesis 2a: The absorptive capacity of the CV manager moderates the 
negative relationship between the corporate manager’s perceived cultural 
distance and CV performance and makes it less negative when the 
absorptive capacity is lower. 
Hypothesis 2b: The absorptive capacity of the CV manager moderates the 
negative relationship between the CV manager’s perceived cultural 
distance and CV performance and makes it less negative when the 
absorptive capacity is lower. 
Hypothesis 2c: The absorptive capacity of the CV manager moderates the 
negative relationship between measured cultural distance and CV 





There is a lag between learning and change in culture (March, 1991).  Learning 
can occur at the individual level.  However, for this to change corporate culture, the 
learning will have to be disseminated throughout the corporation (March, 1991).  
Research shows environmental conditions, such as turbulence, can impact to what degree 
corporations seek out innovative activities and the rate at which they gather and 
disseminate information (Kuratko et al., 2014a).   Turbulence as proposed by Kohli & 
Jaworski (1990), has three components: market turbulence, competitive intensity, and 
technological turbulence.  Turbulence is the combination of the extent to which the 
composition and preferences of a corporation’s customers change over time, the 
behavior, resources, and ability of competitors to differentiate, as well as the extent to 
which technology in an industry was in a state of flux (Jaworski & Kohli, 1993).  A 
potential benefit of operating in high turbulence is it can increase the rate and amount of 
change that occurs in a venture’s culture.  Turbulent environments require that a company 
adapt to the external environment and can lead managers to seek out new information and 
opportunities to learn.  Research has shown that in times of high environmental 
turbulence, corporations will more actively seek out innovative activities (Kuratko et al., 
2014a).  This need to actively innovate in a turbulent environment could alter the level of 
impact cultural distance has on the amount of success that a venture realizes. 
Corporations seek out innovative activities because unpredictable market 
conditions lead to corporations not only being challenged to grow and venture but also 
for the survival of the organization (Kuratko et al., 2014b).  This could indicate that in 
times of high environmental turbulence or in industries that are inherently turbulent, 
managers may be more open to seeking out different and even radical ideas.  The impact 
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of environmental turbulence is twofold.  First, firms have been shown to place different 
values on their dynamic capabilities in turbulent environments (Eisenhardt & Martin, 
2000).  Second, in turbulent environments, it is more difficult for other firms to imitate 
the actions of a firm, increasing the level of sustainability of any advantage created in a 
turbulent environment (Helfat et al., 2009; Song et al., 2005).   In a turbulent 
environment, there may be a difference in the level of perceived opportunity to learn for 
venture managers from the ideas of a culturally different parent. 
When a corporation is engaged in corporate venturing and the venture operates in 
high environmental turbulence, the venture manager may more actively seek external 
knowledge from the corporate parent.  Also, if a CV is operating in a turbulent 
environment it may be more innovative than a CV in a less turbulent environment.  This 
would create a situation where a CV is generating innovation and knowledge at a high 
rate and also seeking external knowledge at a high rate.  The need to survive in turbulent 
environments could increase the level of tolerance for cultural friction from both 
managers and reduce the impact cultural distance has on the success of the venture.  
While cultural distance would still exist between a parent and its CV, a high level of 
environmental turbulence could facilitate an improved relationship between the 
management teams leading to increased sharing between the two and a more successful 
venture.  
Hypothesis 3a: The level of turbulence moderates the negative 
relationship between the corporate manager’s perceived cultural distance 
and CV performance and makes it less negative when turbulence is higher. 
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Hypothesis 3b: The level of turbulence moderates the negative 
relationship between the CV manager’s perceived cultural distance and 
CV performance and makes it less negative when turbulence is higher. 
Hypothesis 3c: The level of turbulence moderates the negative 
relationship between measured cultural distance and CV performance and 
makes it less negative when turbulence is higher. 
Congruence 
 Cultural distance research identifies one of the primary adverse effects of an 
increase in cultural distance is the decrease of ease of communication between two 
parties (Shenkar, 2001).  The degree to which culturally distant managers agree on the 
amount of cultural distance that exists could facilitate understanding and empathy and 
reduce the amount of difficulty the managers have communicating.  Greater ease of 
communication between the managers could reduce the negative impact cultural distance 
has on their relationship.  This work was originally referring to the relationship between 
corporations in multiple countries that would obviously have varying national cultures.  
In this research, I extend this into the divergence of cultures that can occur between a 
traditional corporation and their newly-created CV.   Potentially the largest cost of 
friction between a parent corporation manager and a CV manager would be the straining 
of the relationship to the extent it causes a failure of a CV.  Research supports this by 
showing that the difficulties associated with CVs can be partially derived from nuanced 
sources such as strained personal relationships between managers instigated in part by 
divergent corporate cultures (Sherman, 1992; Tallman & Shenkar, 1994). 
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A CV manager serves in the role of a professional manager for the parent 
corporations’ wholly-owned CV.  Scholars have shown that there is a benefit to having a 
professional manager (Fama & Jensen, 1983).  A strained relationship between the 
professional manager of a CV and the corporate manager could decrease the amount of 
benefit the corporation receives from its professional venture manager.  This implies 
obtaining congruence between the distant parties could have positive impacts on 
performance.  Congruence as to the amount of distance that exists could increase the 
understanding and empathy between managers and lessen the intensity of the impact of 
cultural distance on the relationship.  While cultural distance between a parent 
corporation and a CV seems necessary, cultural friction, which is correlated with negative 
results, is not necessary.  Cultural friction only occurs when the two cultures clash during 
interaction (Shenkar, 2001).  A possible contributor to an increase in the amount of 
cultural friction between culturally different companies is a lack in the amount of 
symmetry of perceived cultural distance.  When asymmetry increases it would manifest 
itself as a decrease in the level of congruence in the perceptions of the corporate and 
venture manager as to the amount of cultural distance that exists between the two 
companies.  Thus, one manager would perceive the amount of distance to be significantly 
larger or smaller than the other manager and be less understanding and empathetic.  
Moving between cultures often requires a degree of translation; however, translations 
may not always be perfect.  Congruence of the managers’ perceptions of distance could 
facilitate the managers having higher levels of understanding and empathy and even 
though cultural distance exists if may have a less negative impact on the relationship and 
not impede successful outcomes.   
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Hypothesis 4a: The level of cultural distance congruence will moderate 
the negative relationship between the corporate manager’s perceived 
cultural distance and CV performance and makes it less negative when 
congruence is higher. 
Hypothesis 4b: The level of cultural distance congruence will moderate 
the negative relationship between CV manager’s perceived cultural 
distance and CV performance and makes it less negative when congruence 
is higher. 
Hypothesis 4c: The level of cultural distance congruence will moderate 
the negative relationship between measured cultural distance and CV 







CHAPTER III: METHODS 
This project relies on data collected through electronic surveys.  I have collected 
unique, dyadic survey data from both United States parent corporations and their CVs as 
well as international parent corporations and their CVs.  Collecting an international 
dataset both increases the applicability of research and reduces the limitations of my 
research.  This study utilizes dyadic data collected from both the parent corporation and 
the CV.   
The Mergent Intellect Database was used to identify companies to target for 
participation in this project.  This database was appropriate for the scope of this project as 
it included information on over 245 million companies throughout the world.  The 
database included information at both the corporation and executive levels.  The 
corporation level information included address, SIC codes, annual sales, and other 
identifying information.  The executive-level information included the title and contact 
information of key executives.  In the instance of US companies, the executive title in 
combination with the size of the company was used to identify corporations that were 
likely involved in corporate ventures. 
It was possible that this data collection would have occasionally required in-
person visits either initially or as a followup.  For this reason, companies were originally 
selected regionally to be near the university in the US or near the institution of the 
international-contact assisting with data collection.  In the US, the firms that were 
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identified fell into a twelve-state region that included West Virginia, Virginia, Tennessee, 
Georgia, Kentucky, Indiana, Ohio, Illinois, Arkansas, Texas, North Carolina, and 
Missouri.  This research assumed that this is a broad geographic region containing a 
diverse set of corporations and did not reduce generalizability. 
There is a precedent in the literature to support conducting CV research on 
samples of very large corporations.  Previous research has utilized the companies found 
in the Fortune 500 (e.g., Von Hippel, 1977; Klavans et al., 1985) or a list of the largest 
corporations in a country (e.g., Thornhill & Amitt, 2001).  Also, research indicates that 
only large corporations are likely to have sufficient resource bases to support CV 
activities (Burgelman & Valikangas, 2005).   Following this trend, I have designed my 
study to only include firms with $50 million or more in sales.  To provide consistency 
among the data, firms in all countries were selected for inclusion using the same sales 
level.  Additionally, among the US firms more extensive job title information is provided 
and the pool for potential targets was confined to corporations with an executive title 
indicative of a corporation engaging in CVs.  The executive titles provided by Mergent 
that were indicative of corporate venturing are Business Development Director, VP of 
Corporate Development, and VP of Product Development. 
To verify that the companies are involved in corporate venturing and to solicit 
their participation in the survey, I contacted each of the identified companies.  The 
countries originally included in this project were The United States, Italy, Canada, 
Germany, Spain, Mexico, Singapore, and Brazil.  The preliminary number of 
corporations identified per country is indicated below in Table 1.  To aid in overcoming 
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survivor bias, each identified corporation was asked not only to report on ongoing 
ventures but ventures that have been terminated as well. 
 
 Initial calls were made to the originally identified corporations, with the intent to 
send emails with invitations to participate in the research project.  Due to intensive 
screening protocols at these companies, I had to employ other tactics.  Although I could 
find the executive responsible for pursuing corporate ventures, there were rarely direct-
line or email information provided so I would be relegated to talking to an operator or 
administrative assistant.  Corporations were then very guarded in granting me contact 
with the executives themselves, but rather their assistant, so I couldn’t make my direct 
pitch to the person I needed participation from.  I used international partners at partnering 
universities to gain participation in Mexico and Italy.  I also used job title searches in 
LinkedIn to send network requests to executives in charge of corporate venturing.  In 
LinkedIn, I had a total of 890 executives that either accepted my request to join my 
network or responded to a message.  I selected LinkedIn because it provided a medium 
where I could initiate conversations directly with executives responsible for a 
corporation’s venturing activities.  An additional benefit of LinkedIn is it allowed me to 
drop my geographic boundaries in the United States through which I was able to solicit 
and receive participation from a geographically diverse group of corporations.   
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From this effort, I had 40 corporations participate and complete surveys on 
ventures.  I eliminated one of these companies due to them not meeting the revenue 
threshold.  In total, I collected usable data from 39 corporations and 159 corporate 
ventures, on average about four ventures per corporation.  Of these 159 ventures, 74 were 
internally generated and 85 were externally acquired.  On average, the age of the venture 
was 6.7 years.  The distribution of the companies is shown below in Table 2.  Overall 
response rates were low, but ventures per corporation were good at about 4 per 
corporation.  The 39 corporations had an average revenue of $4.6B USD (s.d. $12.8B) 
and average employees of 8,945 (s.d. 23,690).  Using a semi-randomized sample of 50 
non-respondents with a similar distribution by country, I compared respondents and 
nonrespondents.  This showed the nonresponding companies to have an average revenue 
of $17.2B USD (s.d. $27.2B USD) and average employees of 51,404 (s.d. 91,334).   
While this difference in the size of respondents and non-respondents is 
uncommon among research in the area (e.g. Covin et al., 2016), it can be explained.  
While most of the previous data collections into corporate venturing have been into only 
US firms (e.g. Covin et al., 2016; Klavans es al., 1985), my data set is international and 
the international corporations had lower average revenue than US firms $2.6B USD and 
$5.9B USD, respectively.  The average revenue of my data set is very similar to previous 
research in this area (e.g. Covin et al., 2016) with an average of $5.5B USD.  Also, it is 
possible that from using the new approach with contacting executives through social 
media, I was able to have conversations directly with executives from larger corporations.  
In my experience, I was much more successful at starting conversations with 
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 Surveys are shown to be the most appropriate means for collecting data pertaining 
to corporate ventures (Shrader & Simon, 1997).  Data from secondary sources lack the 
nuances usually needed for detailed analysis of corporate ventures (Shrader & Simon, 
1997).  There is no secondary source from which data can be obtained for several of the 
independent variables I am studying.  I used surveys to collect my data for analysis.  
While scholars have found it useful to hand-deliver surveys when conducting research on 
CVs (Garrett et al., 2009; Covin et al., 2016), the international scope of this research 
makes face-to-face interaction with all of the respondents infeasible.  Due to this, I 
utilized Qualtrics to distribute online surveys. 
 All of the companies identified as potentially engaging CVs in each country were 
contacted to confirm that they were engaging in CVs and were willing to participate in 
the study.  The online survey is designed so that the participants initially answered 
whether they are the corporate manager or the venture manager.  If the respondent 
selected corporate manager, they were first asked a set of identifying questions.  They 
were asked to identify the corporation they are at and to name the CV with either the 
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actual name or a code name.  If a code name was used, the venture manager was later 
asked to provide this code name.  The parent name and CV name was later used to 
associate the correlating parent and venture data together.  The corporate manager was 
also asked to identify the name and email information of the venture manager so that they 
could be contacted to complete the venture manager portion of the survey.  In the cases of 
a parent corporation with multiple ventures, the corporate manager was able to complete 
the survey multiple times to include a survey for each venture. 
 The corporate manager was asked to complete information about each venture 
indicating the background information about each venture.  They were also asked to 
answer questions about their perceptions of their company and the venture’s corporate 
culture.  Also, they were asked about the turbulence of the marketplace and the 
absorptive capacity of the parent corporation.  It was requested that they also complete 
questions about the performance of the venture and the extent to which the parent 
corporation has learned from the venture.  The survey contained instructions to the 
corporate manager that for the purposes of this research they are to consider only 
businesses that were initially intended to operate as new businesses.  They were provided 
with a figure adapted from Morris et al. (2010) to identify if the venture constituted a new 
business.  See Figure 2.  Corporate managers were asked to identify ventures that were 
both still active and ventures that had been terminated.  This research asked corporate 
managers to consider defunct ventures to avoid skewing the results with survivor bias.  
Research identifies seven years or less as an appropriate range for identifying new 
business ventures (McDougall, 1989; Zahra et al. 2000; & Covin et al., 2016).  As such, 





Corporate cultural distance is the measure of how different corporate cultures are.  
Cultural distance is often measured using the scale developed by Kogut and Singh (1988) 
where the scale is used to measure how far removed from a singular culture the other 
cultures are.  This approach could be leading to confounded variables problems where the 
results are not representative of cultural distance, but are a representation of national 
cultural effects of the various countries compared to the country of the base culture 
(Brouthers et al., 2016).  As suggested by Brouthers et al. (2016), in this research I use 
samples of parent corporations from more than two different home countries to overcome 
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this confounded variable problem.  Another problem with the traditional way of 
measuring cultural distance is that the subtleties of culture are notoriously difficult to 
conceptualize and scale (Shenkar, 2001).  This is partly due to culture having many 
different aspects that can each impact the relationship between two firms (Tallman & 
Shenkar, 1994).  To overcome this, I am using an adapted version of the scale developed 
by Chatterjee et al. (1992) which measures multiple components of the corporate culture. 
This instrument contains seven components of corporate culture: 1) innovation and action 
orientation, 2) risk-taking attitude, 3) lateral independence, 4) top management contact, 
5) autonomy and decision-making, 6) performance orientation, and 7) reward orientation.  
These are determined using a total of twenty-nine questions, each of which is answered 
using a seven-point Likert scale.  Both managers are asked to compare the culture of their 
company with that of either the parent or CV.  A response of “1” indicates the two are 
very similar and a response of “7” indicates the two are very different.  Culture is 
composed of many perceptions and nuances that are difficult to measure (Shenkar, 2001).  
To overcome this, I adapt the instrument to provide a confirming measure of distance.  
Using the same series of questions, I ask both the parent and CV manager to rate the level 
of importance of each concept to their company.  The questions are measured using a 
seven-point scale.  An answer of “1” indicates the respondent strongly agrees that the 
concept is important and an answer of “7” indicates the respondent strongly disagrees.  
From these two measures, I calculate cultural distance as the absolute distance between 
the two responses which should help control for each manager’s perceptions of the other 




Cultural distance was collected from both the corporate and venture manager.  
These two scales were both shown to have strong reliability as they both showed a 
Cronbach’s alpha of 0.97.  I then used the six components that loaded heaviest on to the 
first factor to create a single summated scale for each measure following the 
recommendations of Aiken & West (1991).  To create the calculated measure for cultural 
distance, I measured corporate culture of the parent corporation and venture from their 
respective managers.  These scales were both shown to have strong reliability with 
Cronbach’s alpha of 0.94 and 0.93, respectively. Using the same technique, I then created 
a summated score for each of the individual companies’ culture and found the absolute 
value difference between the parent and venture to create “calculated cultural distance.”   
Absorptive Capacity 
 Absorptive capacity is the ability of a firm to utilize external knowledge through 
the processes of exploratory, transformative, and exploitative learning (Lane et al., 2006).  
To measure this, I utilize the absorptive capacity scale developed previously by scholars 
(Lichtenthaler, 2009).  The scale is comprised of six total items to measure the three 
types of learning.  The three types of learning are: exploratory, exploitative, and 
transformative.  Each of the three types of learning is divided into two subscales.  
Exploratory learning is comprised of the ability first to recognize and then assimilate 
information. Exploitative learning is composed of the ability to both transmute and apply 
information.  Transformative learning is comprised of the ability to both maintain and 
then reactivate information.  The scale is comprised of twenty-five individual questions, 
all of which are adapted to be answered using a seven-point Likert scale.  The questions 
ask each manager to rate their level of agreement that their company engages in various 
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activities where a “1” indicates they strongly disagree and a “7” indicates they strongly 
agree.   
Absorptive capacity was measured for both the parent corporation and the 
venture.  These scales were both tested and showed strong reliability with Cronbach’s 
alpha of 0.95 and 0.96, respectively.  Then, following the guidance of Aiken and West 
(1991), I used the six components that loaded the heaviest to the first factor to create 
summated scores for each of these variables. 
Turbulence 
 Turbulence for this research is measured as comprehensive environmental 
turbulence.  Environmental turbulence is the rate of change in the composition of the 
environment (Jaworski & Kohli, 1993).  To capture this, I used an instrument that both 
measures for turbulence and the competitive intensity of the environment.  The 
turbulence instrument I used was developed through the previous work of scholars 
(Jaworski & Kohli, 1993).  This scale is comprised of three items: market turbulence, 
competitive intensity, and technological turbulence.  The turbulence scale is comprised of 
fifteen total questions of which each manager is asked to express their agreement with the 
statements about the state of the environment using a seven-point Likert scale.  A 
response of “1” indicates that the manager strongly disagrees and a response of “7” 
indicates that they strongly agree.  This item was collected from the venture manager.  In 
this study, I considered what is the impact of change in turbulences at the venture level, 
from the CV’s industry, and how it impacts perceptions of success.  The full set of 
questions and the description of the scale are available in the Appendix.  
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The scale for turbulence showed strong reliability with a Cronbach’s alpha score 
of 0.87.  Following the guidance of Aiken and West (1991) I used the six components 
that loaded the heaviest to the first factor to create summated scores for each of these 
variables.     
Perceived Cultural Distance Congruence 
 The perceived cultural distance congruence item is a calculated measure.  This 
item is calculated as the absolute distance between the responses of the manager of the 
parent corporation and the CV manager to their amount of perceived cultural distance 
between the two companies.  Since culture contains perceptions and nuances (Shenkar, 
2001), and since cultural distance is not inherently symmetrical from each company to 
the other (Shenkar, 2001), this added variable will offer insight into understanding the 
impact of perceptions about culture and cultural distance.  This variable is the calculated 
absolute value between the summated scores for cultural distance measured from the 
perspective of both the corporate and venture manager. 
Dependent Variables 
Venture Performance 
 In this study, venture performance was measured using a multiple question scale.  
These questions were asked of the corporate manager as s/he had access to the complete 
financial profile and corporate expectations for the CV.  This was measured on a 7-point 
Likert scale where 1 signaled strongly disagree and 7 signaled strongly agree.  The four 
questions asked about performance were: 1.) The venture generally meets (or met) the 
expectations of the parent corporation, 2.) The parent corporation views (or viewed) this 
venture as being successful, overall, 3.) The parent corporation believes (or believed) that 
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this venture achieved its key milestones (i.e., events crucial to the venture’s successful 
development) on schedule for each stage of its development, & 4.) This venture is 
performing (or performed) well in terms of the criteria (e.g., financial returns, market 
share, learning/acquisition of new knowledge) the parent corporation considers (or 
considered) important to the venture’s success.  If the venture had been terminated, the 
corporate manager was asked to answer these questions for the venture’s final year of 
operation.  This is important due to the understanding that a venture could terminate for 
reasons other than failure, such as it reached its end goal (Geringer & Hebert, 1991). 
 This measure of venture success was measured using the scales developed and 
used by Kuratko et al., (2009).  The utilization of a manager’s subjective evaluations of 
performance has been widely used in research (e.g., Dess & Robinson, 1984; Covin et al., 
1990; Garrett & Covin, 2015).  An advantage of utilizing subjective measures is that it 
allows us to collect performance data on early-stage ventures even if objective data is not 
yet available (Dess & Robinson, 1984).  These subjective performance measures were 
collected from both the corporate manager and the venture manager.  Since it is the 
parent corporation that ultimately decides if the venture will continue operations, the 
corporate manager's responses were utilized as the dependent variable.  Also, even 
though subjective performance measures gained from managers can be influenced by 
personality (Zahra et al., 2002) and the individual manager’s perceptions (Bantel, 1998), 
the corporate manager is less likely to be overly biased in overestimating the performance 
of the CV. 
The scale for venture success was tested for reliability and yielded a Cronbach’s 
alpha of 0.95, indicating strong scale reliability.  After testing the reliability using the 
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guidance of Aiken and West (1991), I used the four individual components of venture 
success to create a summated success score. 
Control Variables 
 I captured and utilized three corporation level controls in my model.  The three 
used were: number of employees, number of ventures, and percentage of sales in largest 
industry.  The number of employees was measured by asking the corporate manager an 
open-ended question.  The average number of employees among the corporations that 
participated was 12,194 (s.d. 28,622).  The number of ventures was measured as the 
number of ventures the corporation had started in the last seven years.  The average 
response from the participating corporations was 10.7 (s.d. 12.3) ventures.  The corporate 
manager was also asked to identify which percentage of the corporation’s total annual 
sales came from their single largest industry.  The average response from the 
participating corporations was 75.13 (s.d. 22) percentage. 
 I also captured and utilized six venture-level controls in my model.  The six used 
were: stage of the venture, the number of ventures previously manage by the venture 
manager, venture age, venture autonomy, operational independence, and learning 
extensiveness.  The stage of the venture was qualified as 1.) Early Stage Venture that has 
received funding but not yet generated any revenue, 2.) Middle Stage Venture that is 
generating revenue but is not profitable, or 3.) Established Stage Venture that is currently 
generating some level of profit.  The average of the participating ventures was 1.68 (s.d. 
0.83).  The venture manager was asked as a measure of experience how many ventures 
s/he had previously managed not including the current venture.  The average among the 
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participating managers was 4.9 (s.d. 1.2) ventures.  The venture age was collected from 
the venture manager and I found an average age of 6.6 (s.d. 3.3) years. 
 Venture autonomy was also collected and utilized as a control from the venture 
manager.  The scale used for venture autonomy was first developed and utilized in 
Johnson (2012).   The construct of venture autonomy was used to measure the extent to 
which the venture management was responsible for establishing goals, timetables, and 
internal operations of the venture (Johnson, 2012).  This scale consisted of twelve 
statements to which the venture manager indicated their level of agreement using a 
seven-point Likert scale.  For a full list of the statements, please refer to the appendix.  I 
used Chronbach’s alpha to test the reliability of the scale and received a score of 0.93, 
indicating the scale had strong reliability.  Using the advice of Aiken & West (1991), I 
used these multiple components to create a single summated score for analysis.  The 
result of this summated score was an average of 4.46 (s.d. 1.63). 
 Operations independence was also collected and utilized as a control from the 
venture manager.  The scale used for operations independence was first developed and 
utilized in Johnson (2012).  The construct of operations independence was used to 
measure to what extent the venture’s operations were linked to those of the corporation 
and its other businesses (Johnson, 2012).  This scale consisted of three statements to 
which the venture manager was asked to express their level of agreement to using a 
seven-point Likert scale.  For a complete list of the statements used, please refer to the 
appendix.  I used Chronbach’s alpha to test the reliability of the scale and received a 
score of 0.89, indicating that the scale had strong reliability.  Using the advice of Aiken 
and West (1991), I used these multiple components to create a single summated score for 
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use in my analysis.  The result of this summated score was an average level of 
independence of 5.25 (s.d. 1.22). 
 Learning extensiveness of the venture was also collected and utilized as a control 
variable in the models.  The scale used to collect learning extensiveness had previously 
been utilized in Covin et al., (2018).  Learning extensiveness refers to the level to which a 
venture can obtain and apply valuable knowledge from their corporate parent (Covin et 
al., 2018).  This scale consisted of eleven statements in which the venture manager was 
asked to what degree their level of knowledge had increased since the start of the venture.  
They were asked to use a seven-point Likert scale to indicate the amount to which their 
level of knowledge had increased.  For a complete list of the statements and scale used, 
please refer to the appendix.  I used Chronbach’s alpha to test the reliability of this scale 
and received a score of 0.93, indicating that the scale had strong reliability.  I then used 
the advice of Aiken and West (1991) to consolidate these factors into a single summated 
score.  The result of the summated score was average learning extensiveness of 4.46 (s.d. 
1.48).    
Analysis Techniques 
 The complete research model which includes moderation was analyzed using 
hierarchical linear modeling (HLM).  HLM is appropriate, because of the two levels of 
the corporate parent and the venture level data.  Several of the items used in this study 
were originally developed using exploratory factor analysis (EFA) to develop constructs 
(e.g., cultural distance, absorptive capacity, and environmental turbulence).  I used 
confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) to verify that the individual items are reliably loading 
to the constructs with the sample that I am using.  Secondly, I used HLM8 to test the 
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moderating hypothesis as well as the complete model.  In accordance with the 
recommendation of Aiken & West (1991), I tested my moderation hypothesis by 
centering the variables in the moderation relationship and creating a moderation term 
through the multiplication of these new centered variables.  In addition to collecting the 
independent and dependent variables described, I also collected control variables not 







CHAPTER IV: RESULTS 
 Tables 3 and 4 below show the descriptive statistics and correlations between the 
research variables.  I present the HLM results in Tables 5-7.  Table 5 is the research 
model using cultural distance measured from the perspective of the corporate manager.  
Table 6 uses cultural distance from the perspective of the venture manager, and Table 7 is 
the calculated cultural distance measure.  In each of these three tables, I show all four 
HLM models.  Model 1includes all of the control variables.  The independent variable of 
cultural distance is added in model 2.  Model 3 then adds each of the moderator variables 
and finally, Model 4 includes the interaction terms. 
I first ran a naïve model in HLM, which is a model that only includes the 
independent variable.  From this naïve model, I was able to obtain sigma squared and tau 
scores which I then used to calculate the variance explained at both the corporate level, 
level two, and venture level, level one.  Using sigma squared and tau from the HLM 
naïve model I calculated that 22% of the variance is explained from corporate-level data,  
confirming that HLM is the appropriate option for analyzing this data.   
I then used HLM to run my full empirical models of the 159 ventures.  In each of 
the three empirical models, Tables 5-7, the HLM analysis showed that one of the control 
variables, Learning Extensiveness, is positively related with the level of venture success 
(p<.05).  The three empirical models only showed a statistically significant relationship 
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between cultural distance and venture success when cultural distance was measured from 








1 Venture Success 
5.41 1.45 0.95 
2 Cultural Distance 
(corporate manager) 2.84 1.76 0.97 
3 Cultural Distance 
(venture manager) 3.08 1.59 0.97 
4 Cultural Distance 
(calculated) 1.14 0.98 n.a. 
5 Absorptive Cabacity 
(venture) 4.82 1.33 0.96 
6 Turbulence 4.28 1.19 0.87 
7 Congruence 1.16 1.30 n.a. 
8 Employees of 
Corporation* 
    
12,193.89  
        
28,622.04  
n.a. 
9 # of Ventures Started 
in the last 7 years* 10.68 12.28 n.a. 
10 Corporate % of 
revenue from largest 
industry* 
75.13 22.00 n.a. 
11 Stage of the Venture 1.68 0.83 n.a. 
12 # of ventures 
previously managed 4.88 1.19 n.a. 
13 Venture Age (in 
years) 
6.64 3.27 n.a. 
14 Venture Autonomy 4.46 1.63 0.93 
15 Operational 




4.46 1.48 0.93 
* These variables are measured at the corporate parent level, so N=37 

















 Table 6 shows that when measuring cultural distance from the perspective of the 
venture manager, there is a main effect and that an increase in cultural distance is 
negatively related with the level of venture success (p<.05).  All three empirical models, 
Tables 5-7, show that regardless of the manner of measuring cultural distance, one of the 
proposed moderators had a direct effect, congruence between the corporate and venture 
managers’ perceptions of cultural distance.  This showed that an increase in a lack of 
congruence between the perceptions of the two managers is negatively related to venture 
success (p<.001).  The empirical model using cultural distance measured from the 
venture manager, Table 6, shows statistically significant interaction effects.  Table 6 
shows that when using cultural distance measured from the perspective of the venture 
manager shows that the absorptive capacity of the venture positively moderates the 
relationship between cultural distance and venture success (p<.001).  
Cultural distance was measured in three separate manners for this research: from 
the perspective of the corporate manager, from the perspective of the venture manager, 
and a calculated score based on the two manager’s perceptions of their own company’s 
culture.  I used these three separate measures to run my three separate sets of HLM 
models and test my various sets of hypotheses.  Of the three manners of measuring 
cultural distance, the measure from the perspective of the venture manager was the only 
one to be statistically significant at the p<.1 level.  This only showed support for 
Hypothesis 1b from my first set of hypotheses.  The complete results of which 
hypotheses were supported or not supported can be seen in Table 8.  The hypotheses that 
were supported showed support that an increase in cultural distance from the perspective 
of the venture manager negatively impacted venture success.  The research also found 
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support for Hypothesis 2b.  Support for this hypothesis supported that an increase in the 
absorptive capacity of the venture positively moderated the impact of cultural distance on 
the success of the venture. 
Table 8. 
Hypotheses Results 
Hypothesis Supported or Not 
1a. Not Supported 
1b. Supported* 
1c. Not Supported 
2a. Not Supported 
2b. Supported*** 
2c. Not Supported 
3a. Not Supported 
3b. Not Supported 
3c. Not Supported 
4a. Not Supported 
4b. Not Supported 
4c. Not Supported 
Final estimation of fixed effects (with robust standard errors 
in parenthesis) are reported +p<.1; *p<.05; **p<.01; 
***p<.001 
  
I tested for the potential of endogeneity using instrumental variables.  I chose 
these instrumental variables using the criteria that they not be correlated with my research 
model’s dependent variable.  I chose “parent-venture similarity” and “top management 
support of the venture”.  While some authors prefer to use different software packages 
and specific statistical tests for testing endogeneity (i.e. Stata and the Wu-Hausman test), 
these were not the most appropriate for my data.  HLM is a statistical modeling technique 
that can account for variation at multiple levels and is appropriate to use when working 
with nested data (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002).  Fortunately, there is an analysis technique 
developed my Semadeni et al., (2014) that allows for testing for endogeneity while using 
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HLM.  I used the two-stage analytical approach recommended by Semadeni et al., (2014) 
with my data to test for endogeneity.  I used SPSS to run simple regressions with my 
instrumental variables and regress these on the dependent variable.  From these simple 
regression models, I saved the residuals as new variables.  I then added these new 
variables to my HLM models.  The addition of this new variable did not significantly 
impact any of the hypothesized effects.  Since the addition of this variable in essence left 
the research model unchanged it suggests that endogeneity is not a problem in my 
models. 
 Due to the nature of the data, having very large standard deviations among size 
measures of the participating corporation, I was concerned that heterogeneity of the data 
may be impacting my results.  A common test for heterogeneity is to remove the outliers 
and then run the model without outliers.  To test this, I followed the advice of Howell et 
al. (1998) by removing corporations from the data set further than three standard 
deviations from the mean revenue of corporations.  With my data, the large standard 
deviation created a problem.  Because the standard deviation was larger than the mean, 
this process only resulted in removing one corporation from consideration.  The results of 
running the model without this one corporation had no significant changes. 
 Heterogeneity of error variance can be a large problem in data analysis if 
variances are a result of level 1 or level 2 variables and are not random (Raudenbush & 
Byrk, 2002).  Luckily in HLM 7 and above, it is possible to test for these problems by 
running the variance-covariance components test of level 2 variables and homogeneity of 
level 1 variables (Garson, 2013).  Following the advice of Raudenbush & Byrk (2002), I 
was able to see if heterogeneity in the data was significantly impacting my results.  To do 
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this, I first obtained the deviance from my base HLM model.  I then added this into the 
model of hypothesis testing and set the model to test for homogeneity.  The variance-
covariance components test yielded a p-value of greater than 0.500.  This result signals 
that level 2 covariance reduced deviance by a non-significant amount (Garson, 2013).  
The results of the homogeneity test yielded a p-value of greater than 0.500.  This tested 
the assumption that when the model is run for each of the 159 ventures, they have 
homogenous residual variance (Garson, 2013).  The result of this test was a non-
significant p-value, which indicates heterogeneity in the data is not a problem 







CHAPTER V: DISCUSSION 
 The implications of this research are a contribution in the already established but 
underdeveloped theory of parenting advantage.  The parenting advantage literature shows 
that a venture can perform better by having a particular corporate parent than any other 
corporate parent (Campbell et al., 1995).  What the parenting advantage doesn’t consider 
is that this may be a more complex issue than just if a corporate parent has beneficial or 
complementary resources or assets for their venture.  There could be underlying factors 
that strain this parental relationship and inhibit the parent corporation from sufficiently 
nurturing their venture and transferring the parenting advantage to them.  This concept 
has gained support in research of human parents and their offspring as cultural distance 
between parents and children has shown negative outcomes in the children (Tseng & 
Fuligni, 2000).  This research found evidence that an increase in the amount cultural 
distance between a corporate parent and their CV leads to a decrease in the success of the 
respective CV.  This implies that venture success is not purely a function of how well the 
products, markets, or technologies of the parent and venture mesh together.  The 
parenting relationship between a corporation and its ventures is more complex than 
originally thought and is impacted by the amount of distance from the other company.  
The increase in distance may be straining the relationship between the two companies, 
thereby inhibiting the extent to which a parent can transfer any parenting advantage they 
may have to their offspring. 
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 Cultural distance is one of the most popular constructs in international business 
research (Shenkar, 2012).  While CVs are used as vehicles through which corporations 
can enter new international markets (i.e. Birkinshaw, 1997; Callaway, 2008) until this 
point it had not been included in CV literature.  Cultural distance measured from the 
perspective of the venture manager was shown to be the most statistically significant of 
the three measures of distance.  This implies that the venture and its employees, 
represented by the opinions of the venture manager, could be most sensitive to feeling a 
sense of “distance” or “isolation” from the parent corporation.  Shenkar (2001) found that 
an increase in cultural distance can create a “drag” that results in more difficult 
communications and a poorer quality relationship.  I found support that when the venture 
manager perceives there is a greater amount of cultural distance between the parent and 
venture there is indeed a decrease in the success of the venture.  This finding could lead 
to lead to a method for improving CV success.  It is possible, as I have demonstrated, to 
learn about the perceptions of culture that the CV and corporate managers have.  This 
data can be collected by corporations and then used not only to analyze and better 
understand the relationship between the two managers but also to coach the managers 
about these perceptions and how to work through them.  This could provide corporations 
a method through which to improve relationships and CV performance before a CV fails. 
 I devised a calculated measure for cultural distance that was calculated with the 
intent to avoid any biases or prejudices of the venture and corporate manager.  This 
measure was not shown to have a statistically significant impact on venture success.  This 
supports the assertion by Shenkar (2001) that there is no reason to assume symmetry in 
cultural distance.  The calculated measure of cultural distance assumes symmetry in the 
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relationship and was not found to have a statistically significant relationship.  This 
implies that it is not so much a pure measure of cultural distance that creates friction as it 
is the perceptions of distance by the managers.  In practice, this could lead to a change in 
the way corporations communicate and deal with their ventures.  Corporations need to 
improve their ability to communicate effectively with and nurture the ventures that they 
start.  There needs to be a certain amount of understanding or compassion for these newly 
started or acquired businesses.  While ventures are asked to operate, sometimes 
physically or culturally far from the parent corporation, they need to clearly understand 
the goals and purposes of the venture and have this communicated to them clearly from 
the parent.  The parent needs to communicate not only how the venture will be measured 
in matters of success, but also how the venture will be operating and the venture’s role 
with the parent corporation. 
 Although the corporate manager has the obligation to understand the culture of a 
venture is different and make its managers feel like they are understood, the venture 
manager in turn has the obligation to understand the venture is culturally different and 
interact as harmoniously as possible with the parent corporation.  Understanding that 
there is often an amount of cultural distance between the two companies should lead the 
managers to be more understanding while engaging in interactions between the two 
distant companies.  This distance may manifest itself in both unique processes, mental 
and physical, and jargon for describing these activities.  A distant culture in this way 
without the proper level of understanding could function in the same way as having 
conversations in multiple languages.  An increase in understanding distance exists and 
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the languages are not the same should lead to more patience and both sides articulating 
their respective points in a manner more concise. 
Scholars have noted a failure within CV research to include multiple sources of 
data and align with major theoretical streams (Ireland & Webb, 2007; Hill & Gorgoulas, 
2016).  This research used multiple scales from major theoretical streams that contained 
multiple components as part of the survey that was distributed.  Three of these types of 
scales absorptive capacity, turbulence, and corporate culture had interesting loadings.  
While each of the components could be separated out and showed strong scale validity 
and the scales naturally load onto the same number of components, there was usually 
comingling in one primary factor that had the heaviest loadings.  This could indicate that, 
at least with this data set, these traits are simultaneously manifesting across the various 
subdimensions.  This should lead to further exploration into these scales as it may be 
possible in the setting of large corporations, they will frequently manifest themselves in 
this way and not as scales with multiple clear components.  
 Scholars have previously found that there is no correlation between the number of 
CVs a corporation has previously started and the amount of success each venture 
achieves (Kuratko et al., 2009).  This research provides many insights and directions for 
potential future research, as it implies the relationship between the two liaisons could be 
very influential on the amount of success a new venture achieves.  Although not part of 
the model, I found support for a relationship between both learning extensiveness and 
congruence between the managers’ perceptions of corporate culture and venture success.  
Congruence is a calculated measure of the distance between the corporate and venture 
managers’ responses to cultural distance.  This relationship is very difficult to collect 
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primary data on, especially dyadic data from both companies.  This rare glimpse into this 
relationship indicates a need to explore further the intricacies of this relationship and 
explore further how the level of agreement, or the two managers being on the same page, 
impacts their relationship and eventual success of the venture.  I believe this is a very 
interesting point to explore further as it relates to the perceptions of culture more than a 
pure distance of culture.  This is particularly interesting because while the distance 
between a parent and its venture is unavoidable, feelings of distance can be changed 
through changes in the way the two management teams interact with each other.  
Also, while this model analyzes an international data set with ventures from 
multiple countries, it does not control for any impact national culture may have on the 
relationship.  I believe there is an opportunity to explore the relationship between national 
cultural and corporate culture in the future with this data set.  In the context of 
international corporations there is an opportunity to investigate how strongly national 
culture can moderate the corporate culture of an international firm entering that market.  
The ability of a corporation to adapt to a new national culture could impact the amount of 
success the corporation can obtain in this new culture, assuming it is different than the 
culture of its’ home country. 
 As with any research, this study is not immune to having limitations. While this is 
an international data set, it does not include every country or region.  I was unable to 
include any Asian or African corporations or ventures, for example.  While my research 
applies to the western world as it includes ventures from Canada through South America, 
it may lack applicability in far eastern cultures where I was unable to gain data.    
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It also appears, based on the similarity in the size of corporations between my 
study and former studies in the area (e.g. Covin et al., 2016) that there is a natural 
selection bias of certain size corporations to participate.  In my experience, the largest 
corporations, while involved in corporate venturing were more worried about protecting 
data and privacy than participating and potentially learning from research.  Also, smaller 
corporations that may be interested in or participating in venturing activities didn’t 
qualify to participate in this type of research.  While this research should be 
representative of the average corporation involved in corporate venturing, it may not be 
applicable to either the largest or smallest corporations involved in corporate venturing as 
they may face a unique set of challenges uncommon in the majority of venturing 
corporations. 
While my response rates per country were low this seems to be a recurring 
problem in this research.  In part, because it is difficult to identify and/or obtain primary 
data from corporations involved in corporate venturing a large part of the body of 
research of the field is qualitative (Garrett, 2010).  The majority of the few data 
collections into corporate venturing (i.e. Burgers et al., 2009; Covin & Garrett 2009) only 
collected data in their respective home countries.  This collection of primary data marks 
one of the first attempts to collect an international primary data set into corporate 
venturing.  While per country response rates are low, this collection does include a 
comparable number to total ventures to previous research.  In an effort to normalize the 
data I did use the same criteria to include corporations involved in corporate venturing in 
every country.   
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 In conclusion, this research has the potential to make both theoretical and 
practical contirbutions, because my findings show support for the proposition that the 
perceptions of culture impact the success of a corporate venture.  While it may be 
difficult to change perceptions, changing these perceptions could finally lead to higher 
success rates among corporate ventures.  While facing limitations, this research is widely 
applicable as it includes corporations and ventures from various countries and of a wide 
range of sizes.  This research should provide a basis to expand this field of research to 
more carefully understand and improve the relationship between management of parent 
corporations and their ventures.  This research shows this rarely explored relationship is 
deserving of more efforts as it impacts the amount of success a venture can have.  Also, 
since this is a relationship it is something that can be improved through altering the 
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Listing of the Internal Corporate Venturing Research Variables 
 
Corporate Manager Information 
 
Parent Corporation Information 
 
Parent Corporation’s Internal Corporate Venturing Experience 
 
Venture Manager Information-Venture Manager 
 
Venture Background Information 
1. Venture physical location 
2. Venture operational status 
3. Venture development stage 
4. Venture type 
5. Venture age 
6. Venture size 
7. Venture Structural positioning 
 
Cultural Distance- Corporate Manager 
 
Cultural Distance- Venture Manager 
 
Venture Performance – Corporate Manager 
 
Venture Performance – Venture Manager 
 
Turbulence Scales-both managers 
 




Venture Origin-Related Considerations 
1. Top management support. 
 
Venture Autonomy 
1. Venture planning autonomy. 
2. Venture operations autonomy. 
3. Venture operations independence. 
 
Parent-Venture Similarity 




Operationalizations of the Internal Corporate Venturing Research Variables 
 
 
Corporate Manager Information 
 
1. What is your position title? 
____________________________________________________________________ 
2. How long have you been in your current position? __________ 
3. In what year did you join the corporation? __________ 
 
 
Parent Corporation Information 
 
1. What is the name of your corporation? 
__________________________________________________________ 
2. What is the physical location of the corporation? 
______________________________________________ 
3. What is the approximate total sales revenue of your corporation for the latest full fiscal year? 
$__________ 
4. Approximately what percentage of your corporation’s total sales revenue is generated through 
sales made in your corporation’s single largest industry? __________% 
5. Approximately how many persons does your corporation employ? __________ 
6. Is your corporation publicly or privately owned (circle one)?     Public     Private 
 
 
Parent Corporation’s Internal Corporate Venturing Experience 
 
For purposes of the current research, an internal corporate venture is defined as an 
entrepreneurial initiative that originated within the corporate structure (or within an existing 
business of the corporation) and was intended from its inception as a new business for the 























of the Venture 
 
 
































































New Product for 
the Corp. in 
Current Industry 
 
New Product for 
the Corp. in New 
Industry (i.e., 
Diversification) 
   Product Focus of the Venture  
 




1. Approximately how many distinct new internal corporate ventures has your corporation 
financially invested in (i.e., provided some level of start-up funding to) over the past 7 
years regardless of whether these ventures are currently operating or were terminated 
somewhere along their development path? __________ 
 
 
2. How many internal ventures (7 years old or less) is your corporation currently pursuing 
in each of the following stages? 
Early stage venture (start-up funding provided to venture, but no sales revenue yet generated) 
__________ 
Middle stage venture (generating some sales revenue, but no profit) __________ 
Established stage venture (generating some profit) __________ 
 
 
Venture Manager Information- Venture Manager 
 
What is the name of your corporation? 
______________________________________________________________ 
What is your current position title? 
_________________________________________________________________ 
How long have you been employed by your corporation? 
_______________________________________________ 
 
In any corporation, and including the identified venture … 
1. With how many internal new ventures have you been personally and directly involved? 
__________ 
2. For how many internal new ventures have you been the principal manager? __________ 
 
 
Venture Background Information 
 
Where is the venture physically located__________________ 
 
Venture Operational Status – Whether the venture is currently operating or defunct. 
 
Please indicate the operational status of the venture you’re describing. 
_____ This venture is currently operating. 
_____  This venture is defunct – it has been terminated or otherwise expired. 
 
 
Venture Development Stage 
 
Please indicate the development stage of the venture you’re describing. 
_____  Early Stage Venture – These ventures have received financial investment from the 
corporation or their sponsoring division, but are not yet generating any revenue.  Alternatively, 
for a defunct venture in this stage, it never generated any revenue and was terminated. 
_____  Middle Stage Venture – These ventures are currently generating revenue, but are not yet 
profitable.  Alternatively, for a defunct venture in this stage, it generated revenue but never 
generated any profit and was terminated. 
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_____  Established Stage Venture – These ventures are currently generating some profit (total 
estimated revenues exceed total estimated costs).  Alternatively, for a defunct venture in this 
stage, it generated some profit but was, nonetheless, terminated. 
 
If you are describing a middle or established stage venture, please indicate the venture’s revenue 
for its latest year of operation.  (For a defunct venture, please indicate the revenue it generated in 
the year of its expiry.)  $_________________ 
 
Additionally, if you are describing an established stage venture, please indicate the venture’s 
Return-on-Sales percentage (i.e., gross profit-to-sales ratio) for its latest year of operation.  (For a 
defunct venture, please indicate the Return-on-Sales percentage it generated in the year of its 




Internal corporate ventures represent new businesses for the firm.  Please place an “X” in the 























of the Venture 
 
 
































































New Product for 
the Corp. in 
Current Industry 
 
New Product for 
the Corp. in New 
Industry (i.e., 
Diversification) 





For a currently operating venture… please indicate the age of the venture you’re describing, 
using the time at which initial start-up funding was provided to the venture as its founding date. 
__________ years 
 
For a defunct venture… please indicate the age of the venture at the time of its expiration, using 












How many persons are currently assigned to the venture (or were at the time of a defunct 
venture’s expiration) on a full-time basis? __________  …on a part-time basis? 
__________ 
 
Venture Structural Positioning – Where the venture is located in an organizational structure sense 
within the parent corporation. 
 
Please indicate how the venture is (was) positioned within your corporate structure by circling the 
appropriate response to each question. 
 
1. Does (did) the venture exist within a pre-existing,                               Yes     No 
established business of the corporation? 




Cultural Distance Instrument- Venture Manager 
The following items relate to the BELIEFS AND ASSUMPTIONS that top management 
of the parent corporation and its corporate venture have about the IMPORTANCE of some 
business practices and procedures, and how things should be done for the success of a 
business.  This instrument is divided into three columns in the first column the practice or 
procedure you are being asked to respond about is listed. 
 
In the second column you are asked to indicate your level of agreement with: “This practice 
or procedure is one that management of my company believes or assumes is very important 
for the business to succeed.”  Please, circle for each item the most appropriate answer: a 
score of "1" means that you strongly DISAGREE with the statement, while a score of "7" 
means that you strongly AGREE.  
 
In the third column you are asked to indicate your perceptions about the extent to which 
the importance of the following items is DIFFERENT for the top management group of 
your company VERSUS the top management group of the parent corporation. Please, circle 
for each item the most appropriate answer: a score of "1" means that the two top 
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management groups are very SIMILAR, while a score of "7" means that they are very 
DIFFERENT.  
Item Is the item important to your 
company? 
How different is the 
importance of the item to your 
company and the parent 
corporation? 
 Strongly                          
Strongly 
Disagree                           
Agree 
Very                                  
Very                  Similar                           
Different 
1. Managers should share 
information and communicate 
with other subunit of the 
company 
    1      2     3     4     5    6     7     1      2     3     4     5    6     7 
2. Managers should quickly 
respond to changes in the 
business environment 
    1      2     3     4     5    6     7     1      2     3     4     5    6     7 
3. In the long run managers can 
get ahead fastest by playing it 
safe, sure, and slow 
    1      2     3     4     5    6     7     1      2     3     4     5    6     7 
4. Compensation for managers 
should be competitive with 
similar companies 
    1      2     3     4     5    6     7     1      2     3     4     5    6     7 
5. Measures used to judge 
managerial performance should 
be clear 
    1      2     3     4     5    6     7     1      2     3     4     5    6     7 
6. Top management should 
provide support and warmth to 
those managers below them 
    1      2     3     4     5    6     7     1      2     3     4     5    6     7 
7. High autonomy in decision 
making should be given to 
managers 
    1      2     3     4     5    6     7     1      2     3     4     5    6     7 
8. Managers should recognize 
and seize good opportunities as 
they arise  
    1      2     3     4     5    6     7     1      2     3     4     5    6     7 
9. Managers should take 
chances on good ideas 
    1      2     3     4     5    6     7     1      2     3     4     5    6     7 
10. Rewards and recognition 
should be based on a manager’s 
performance 
    1      2     3     4     5    6     7     1      2     3     4     5    6     7 
11. There should be 
continuous pressure to 
improve personal and group 
performance 
    1      2     3     4     5    6     7     1      2     3     4     5    6     7 
12. Formal authority for 
decision making should be 
made clear to all employees 
    1      2     3     4     5    6     7     1      2     3     4     5    6     7 
13. Managers should maintain 
and/or develop 




managers of other departments 
14. Managers should be 
encouraged to be innovative, 
take independent actions, and 
reasonable risks 
    1      2     3     4     5    6     7     1      2     3     4     5    6     7 
Item Is the item important to your 
company? 
How different is the 
importance of the item to your 
company and the parent 
corporation? 
 Strongly                          
Strongly 
Disagree                           
Agree 
Very                                  
Very                  Similar                           
Different 
15. Managers should be 
encouraged to air conflicts and 
constructive criticism openly 
    1      2     3     4     5    6     7     1      2     3     4     5    6     7 
16. Formal rules and 
procedures should be followed 
in making and carrying out all 
activities 
    1      2     3     4     5    6     7     1      2     3     4     5    6     7 
17. Managers should be 
innovative rather than 
conservative in decision 
making 
    1      2     3     4     5    6     7     1      2     3     4     5    6     7 
18. Managerial promotions 
should be highly associated 
with excellence in performing 
the job 
    1      2     3     4     5    6     7     1      2     3     4     5    6     7 
19. Managers should be free to 
make independent decisions 
    1      2     3     4     5    6     7     1      2     3     4     5    6     7 
20. Calculated risks should be 
taken at the right time 
    1      2     3     4     5    6     7     1      2     3     4     5    6     7 
21. Decision-making should be 
timely 
    1      2     3     4     5    6     7     1      2     3     4     5    6     7 
22. Goals should be 
venturesome 
    1      2     3     4     5    6     7     1      2     3     4     5    6     7 
23. Various subunit managers 
should make efforts to 
understand each other’s 
problems and difficulties 
    1      2     3     4     5    6     7     1      2     3     4     5    6     7 
24. Managers should be held 
personally accountable for the 
end results they produce 
    1      2     3     4     5    6     7     1      2     3     4     5    6     7 
25. To be effective, decision 
makers should be very cautious 
    1      2     3     4     5    6     7     1      2     3     4     5    6     7 
26. Responsibility for decisions 
should be clearly 
communicated to all managers 
    1      2     3     4     5    6     7     1      2     3     4     5    6     7 
27. Managers should create and 
maintain effective 




cooperation with peers 
28. Managers should be 
encouraged to expose conflicts 
and to seek ways to resolve 
them 
    1      2     3     4     5    6     7     1      2     3     4     5    6     7 
29. Promotion of managers 
should be based on 
competence as reflected by 
their performance 





Cultural Distance Instrument- Corporate Manager 
The following items relate to the BELIEFS AND ASSUMPTIONS that top management 
of the parent corporation and its corporate venture have about the IMPORTANCE of some 
business practices and procedures, and how things should be done for the success of a 
business.  This instrument is divided into three columns in the first column the practice or 
procedure you are being asked to respond about is listed. 
 
In the second column you are asked to indicate your level of agreement with: “This practice 
or procedure is one that management of my company believes or assumes is very important 
for the business to succeed.”  Please, circle for each item the most appropriate answer: a 
score of "1" means that you strongly DISAGREE with the statement, while a score of "7" 
means that you strongly AGREE.  
 
In the third column you are asked to indicate your perceptions about the extent to which 
the importance of the following items is DIFFERENT for the top management group of 
your company VERSUS the top management group of the venture. Please, circle for each 
item the most appropriate answer: a score of "1" means that the two top management 




Item Is the item important to your 
company? 
How different is the 
importance of the item to your 
company and the venture? 
 Strongly                          
Strongly 
Disagree                           
Agree 
Very                                  
Very                  Similar                           
Different 
1. Managers should share 
information and communicate 
with other subunit of the 
company 
    1      2     3     4     5    6     7     1      2     3     4     5    6     7 
2. Managers should quickly 
respond to changes in the 
business environment 
    1      2     3     4     5    6     7     1      2     3     4     5    6     7 
3. In the long run managers can 
get ahead fastest by playing it 
safe, sure, and slow 
    1      2     3     4     5    6     7     1      2     3     4     5    6     7 
4. Compensation for managers 
should be competitive with 
similar companies 
    1      2     3     4     5    6     7     1      2     3     4     5    6     7 
5. Measures used to judge 
managerial performance should 
be clear 
    1      2     3     4     5    6     7     1      2     3     4     5    6     7 
6. Top management should 
provide support and warmth to 
those managers below them 
    1      2     3     4     5    6     7     1      2     3     4     5    6     7 
7. High autonomy in decision 
making should be given to 
managers 
    1      2     3     4     5    6     7     1      2     3     4     5    6     7 
8. Managers should recognize 
and seize good opportunities as 
they arise  
    1      2     3     4     5    6     7     1      2     3     4     5    6     7 
9. Managers should take 
chances on good ideas 
    1      2     3     4     5    6     7     1      2     3     4     5    6     7 
10. Rewards and recognition 
should be based on a manager’s 
performance 
    1      2     3     4     5    6     7     1      2     3     4     5    6     7 
11. There should be continuous 
pressure to improve personal 
and group performance 
    1      2     3     4     5    6     7     1      2     3     4     5    6     7 
12. Formal authority for 
decision making should be 
made clear to all employees 
    1      2     3     4     5    6     7     1      2     3     4     5    6     7 
13. Managers should maintain 
and/or develop 
interrelationships with 
managers of other departments 
    1      2     3     4     5    6     7     1      2     3     4     5    6     7 
14. Managers should be 
encouraged to be innovative, 
take independent actions, and 
reasonable risks 
    1      2     3     4     5    6     7     1      2     3     4     5    6     7 
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Item Is the item important to your 
company? 
How different is the 
importance of the item to your 
company and the venture? 
 Strongly                          
Strongly 
Disagree                           
Agree 
Very                                  
Very                  Similar                           
Different 
15. Managers should be 
encouraged to air conflicts and 
constructive criticism openly 
    1      2     3     4     5    6     7     1      2     3     4     5    6     7 
16. Formal rules and 
procedures should be followed 
in making and carrying out all 
activities 
    1      2     3     4     5    6     7     1      2     3     4     5    6     7 
17. Managers should be 
innovative rather than 
conservative in decision 
making 
    1      2     3     4     5    6     7     1      2     3     4     5    6     7 
18. Managerial promotions 
should be highly associated 
with excellence in performing 
the job 
    1      2     3     4     5    6     7     1      2     3     4     5    6     7 
19. Managers should be free to 
make independent decisions 
    1      2     3     4     5    6     7     1      2     3     4     5    6     7 
20. Calculated risks should be 
taken at the right time 
    1      2     3     4     5    6     7     1      2     3     4     5    6     7 
21. Decision-making should be 
timely 
    1      2     3     4     5    6     7     1      2     3     4     5    6     7 
22. Goals should be 
venturesome 
    1      2     3     4     5    6     7     1      2     3     4     5    6     7 
23. Various subunit managers 
should make efforts to 
understand each other’s 
problems and difficulties 
    1      2     3     4     5    6     7     1      2     3     4     5    6     7 
24. Managers should be held 
personally accountable for the 
end results they produce 
    1      2     3     4     5    6     7     1      2     3     4     5    6     7 
25. To be effective, decision 
makers should be very cautious 
    1      2     3     4     5    6     7     1      2     3     4     5    6     7 
26. Responsibility for decisions 
should be clearly 
communicated to all managers 
    1      2     3     4     5    6     7     1      2     3     4     5    6     7 
27. Managers should create and 
maintain effective 
communication and 
cooperation with peers 
    1      2     3     4     5    6     7     1      2     3     4     5    6     7 
28. Managers should be 
encouraged to expose conflicts 
and to seek ways to resolve 
them 
    1      2     3     4     5    6     7     1      2     3     4     5    6     7 
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29. Promotion of managers 
should be based on 
competence as reflected by 
their performance 
    1      2     3     4     5    6     7     1      2     3     4     5    6     7 
 
Venture Performance – Corporate Manager 
 
Please respond to the statements below in reference to the venture in question.  Because 
defunct ventures will have performed variously well prior to their expiration/termination, 
I am asking you to complete the following scale even if the venture in question is no 
longer operating.  If the venture is defunct, please indicate how you would have evaluated 
the venture at the time of its expiration/termination.  Indicate your level of agreement (by 
circling the appropriate number) with each statement based on the following scale: 
 Strongly  Slightly  Slightly  Strongly 
 Disagree Disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Agree Agree 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
                                                                                            Strongly                            
Strongly  
                                                                                            Disagree                              
Agree 
 
1.) This venture generally meets (or met) the                        1     2     3     4     5     6     7 
expectations of the parent corporation 
 
2.) The parent corporation views (or viewed) this                 1     2     3     4     5     6     7 
venture as being successful, overall 
 
3.) The parent corporation believes (or believed) that           1     2     3     4     5     6     7 
this venture achieved its key milestones (i.e., events crucial to the venture’s 
successful development) on schedule for each stage of its development 
 
4.) The venture is performing (or performed) well in            1     2    3     4      5     6     7 
terms of the criteria (e.g., financial returns, market share, learning/ 
acquisition of new knowledge) the parent corporation considers (or considered) 




Venture Performance – Venture Manager 
 
Please respond to the statements below in reference to the venture in question.  Because 
defunct ventures will have performed variously well prior to their expiration/termination, 
I am asking you to complete the following scale even if the venture in question is no 
longer operating.  If the venture is defunct, please indicate how you would have evaluated 
the venture at the time of its expiration/termination.  Indicate your level of agreement (by 
circling the appropriate number) with each statement based on the following scale: 
 Strongly  Slightly  Slightly  Strongly 
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 Disagree Disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Agree Agree 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
                                                                                            Strongly                            
Strongly  
                                                                                            Disagree                              
Agree 
 
1.) This venture generally meets (or met) the                        1     2     3     4     5     6     7 
expectations of its managers 
 
2.) The venture managers view (or viewed) this                    1     2     3     4     5     6     7 
venture as being successful, overall 
 
3.) The venture managers believe (or believed) that              1     2     3     4     5     6     7 
this venture achieved its key milestones (i.e., events crucial to the venture’s 
successful development) on schedule for each stage of its development 
 
4.) The venture is performing (or performed) well in        1     2    3     4      5     6     7 
terms of the criteria (e.g., financial returns, market share, learning/ 
acquisition of new knowledge) the venture managers consider (or considered) 




The following items relate to the BELIEFS AND ASSUMPTIONS that top management within 
your corporation has about the turbulences and competition that your corporation faces.  Please, 
circle for each item the most appropriate answer: a score of "1" means that you strongly disagree 
with the statement, while a score of “7" means that you strongly agree.  
 
 
                                                                                            Strongly                            
Strongly  




1.) In our kind of business, customers’ product                        1     2     3     4     5     6     7 
preferences change quite a bit over time 
 
2.) Our customers tend to look for new product all                  1     2     3     4     5     6     7 
the time    
 
3.) We are witnessing demand for our products and services   1     2     3     4     5     6     7 
from customers who never bought them before 
 
4.) New customers tend to have product-related needs that      1     2    3     4      5     6     7 
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are different from those of our existing customers 
 
5.) We cater to many of the same customers that                      1     2     3     4     5     6     7 




1.) Competition in our industry is cutthroat                              1     2     3     4     5     6     7 
 
2.) There are many “promotion wars” in our industry              1     2     3     4     5     6     7 
 
3.) Anything that one competitor can offer, others can             1     2     3     4     5     6     7 
match readily 
 
4.) Price competition is a hallmark of our industry                   1     2     3     4     5     6     7 
 
5.) One hears of a new competitive move almost every day     1     2     3     4     5     6     7 
 
6.) Our competitors are relatively weak                                    1     2     3     4     5     6     7 
 
                                                                                            Strongly                            
Strongly  




1.) The technology in our industry is changing rapidly            1     2     3     4     5     6     7 
 
2.) Technological changes provide big opportunities in           1     2     3     4     5     6     7 
our industry 
 
3.) A large number of new product ideas have been made       1     2     3     4     5     6     7  
possible through technological breakthroughs in our industry 
 







Absorptive Capacity Scales 
 
The following items relate to the learning activities that your company engages in.  Please, 
circle for each item the most appropriate answer: a score of "1" means that you strongly 
disagree with the statement, while a score of “7" means that you strongly agree.  
Absorptive Capacity Scales 
 
                                                                                            Strongly                            
Strongly  




1.) We frequently scan the environment for new                     1     2     3     4     5     6     7 
technologies 
 
2.) We thoroughly observe technological trends                      1     2     3     4     5     6     7 
 
3.) We observe in detail external sources of new                     1     2     3     4     5     6     7 
technologies 
 
4.) We thoroughly collect industry information                       1     2     3     4     5     6     7 
 





1.) We frequently acquire technologies from external              1     2     3     4     5     6     7 
sources 
 
2.) We periodically organize special meetings with                 1     2     3     4     5     6     7 
external partners to acquire new technologies 
 
3.) Employees regularly approach external institutions            1     2     3     4     5     6     7 
to acquire technological knowledge 
 
4.) We often transfer technological knowledge to our firm      1     2     3     4     5     6     7 











2.) Employees store technological knowledge for future         1     2     3     4     5     6     7 
reference 
 
3.) We communicate relevant knowledge across the units       1     2     3     4     5     6     7 
of our firm 
 




                                                                                            Strongly                            
Strongly  





1.) When recognizing a business opportunity, we can             1     2     3     4     5     6     7 
quickly rely on our existing knowledge 
 
2.) We are proficient in reactivating existing                           1     2     3     4     5     6     7 
knowledge for new uses 
 
3.) We quickly analyze and interpret changing market            1     2     3     4     5     6     7 
demands for our technologies 
 
4.) New opportunities to serve our customers with existing    1     2     3     4     5     6     7 




1.) We are proficient in transforming technological                1     2     3     4     5     6     7 
knowledge into new products 
 
2.) We regularly match new technologies with ideas              1     2     3     4     5     6     7 
for new products 
 
3.) We quickly recognize the usefulness of new                     1     2     3     4     5     6     7 
technological knowledge for existing knowledge 
 
4.) Our employees are capable of sharing their expertise        1     2     3     4     5     6     7 






1.) We regularly apply technologies in new products              1     2     3     4     5     6     7 
 
2.) We constantly consider how to better exploit                     1     2     3     4     5     6     7 
technologies 
 
3.) We easily implement technologies in new products           1     2     3     4     5     6     7 
 
4.) It is well known who can best exploit new                         1     2     3     4     5     6     7 




Knowledge Acquisition Extensiveness – The extent to which management’s knowledge pertaining 
to various aspects of operations has increased over the course of the venture’s development. 
 
Please indicate on the following scale (by circling the appropriate number) the extent to which 
management’s knowledge in the following areas increased over the course of the venture’s 
development?  For a venture that is no longer operating, consider knowledge gains from the time 
of the venture’s inception to its expiration. 
 
 What we know about   What we know about   What we know 
about 
 this matter has   this matter has   this matter has 
 not increased   moderately increased   dramatically 
increased 
 since the venture was   since the venture was   since the venture 
was 
 initially approved   initially approved   initially approved 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Knowledge pertaining to… 
1. the determinants of demand in our targeted market.                 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
2. important attributes of product and/or service offerings.                        1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
3. competitive dynamics in our industry.                                           1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
4. important qualities of a viable competitive strategy.                               1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
5. important characteristics of the internal operations (i.e., structure and   1   2   3   4   5   6   7  
process considerations). 
6. characteristics of an effective business model.                                     1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
7. the types of assets/resources needed to excel competitively.                   1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
8. how to best structure relationships between a venture                  1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
and a parent corporation. 
9. how to communicate effectively with others.                             1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
10. new ideas about how to perform my job.                                                1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
11. new skills to improve the way I perform my job.                              1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
 
 
Venture Origin-Related Considerations 
 
IMPORTANT NOTE TO SURVEY RESPONDENT: When a survey item mentions a verb in 
both the present and past tense – for example, the next survey item reads “The venture has 
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(had) the strong support of the parent corporation’s senior-level management.” – the past tense 
wording of the item is meant to apply solely to ventures that are defunct. 
 
Top Management Support – The extent to which the parent company’s senior-level management 
is supportive of the venture. 
 
Please indicate your level of agreement (by circling the appropriate number) with each of the 
following statements based on the following scale: 
 Strongly  Slightly  Slightly  Strongly 
 Disagree Disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Agree Agree 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
1. The venture has (had) the strong support of                                                1  2   3   4   5   6   7  
the parent corporation’s senior-level management. 
2. The venture has (had) a committed champion/advocate                              1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
within the parent corporation’s top management ranks. 
3. The parent corporation’s senior-level management has (had)                     1   2   3   4   5   6   7  
openly expressed verbal commitments to the venture’s success. 
4. Actions and resource allocations of the parent company’s                     1   2   3   4   5   6   7  





Venture Planning Autonomy – The extent to which the venture’s management team (vs. corporate 
parent management) is responsible for establishing goals, timetables, event milestones, and 
strategy for the venture. 
 
Please indicate (by circling the appropriate number) your response to the following question 
based on the following scale. 
   Equally the responsibility                   The sole 
responsibility  
 The sole responsibility  of a higher level(s) of authority        of venture-level 
management 
 of a higher level(s) of authority within the corporation and    
venture-level within the corporation       venture-level management 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Who is (was) responsible for each of the following venture activities and decision areas? 
1. Setting of the venture’s goals.                           1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
2. Establishment of a timetable (if applicable) for the                                1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
achievement of the venture’s goals. 
3. Choice of formal criteria used to measure the venture’s performance.  1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
4. Identification of event milestones (if any) used to                            1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
assess the venture’s progress. 
5. Formulation of the venture’s business strategy.                1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
6. Decision to change (if necessary) the venture’s business strategy.        1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
 
 
Venture Operations Autonomy – The extent to which the venture’s management team (vs. 




Please indicate (by circling the appropriate number) your response to the following question 
based on the following scale. 
   Equally the responsibility                   The sole 
responsibility  
 The sole responsibility  of a higher level(s) of authority        of venture-level 
management 
 of a higher level(s) of authority within the corporation and    
venture-level within the corporation       venture-level management 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Who is (was) responsible for each of the following venture activities and decision areas? 
1. The venture’s operating and decision policies.               1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
2. The venture’s administrative/organizational structure.              1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
3. The venture’s communications and reporting relationships.              1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
4. The venture’s workflow and operating processes.               1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
5. The venture’s standard operating procedures.   1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
6. The venture’s overall business model.                1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
 
 
Venture Operations Independence – The extent to which the venture’s operations are linked to 
those of other businesses of the corporation. 
 
Please indicate your level of agreement (by circling the appropriate number) with each of the 
following statements based on the following scale: 
 Strongly  Slightly  Slightly  Strongly 
 Disagree Disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Agree Agree 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
1. The venture operates (operated) as a self-contained business unit,     1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
with few or weak structural or process linkages with other  
businesses of the corporation. 
2. The venture’s operations are (were) not significantly constrained           1   2   3   4   5   6   7  
or dictated by formal structural or process linkages with  
other businesses of the corporation. 
3. The venture operates (operated) in an independent manner                     1   2   3   4   5   6   7   





Parent-Venture Market Similarity – The extent to which the venture is similar to other businesses 
of the corporation in terms of markets served. 
 
Please indicate your level of agreement (by circling the appropriate number) with each of the 
following statements based on the following scale: 
 Strongly  Slightly  Slightly  Strongly 
 Disagree Disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Agree Agree 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
1. The venture’s actual or proposed customer market is (was)                      1   2   3   4   5   6   7  
94 
 
already served by another business of the corporation. 
2. The venture’s actual or proposed customer market is (was)                     1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
highly similar or strongly related to one already served by  
another business of the corporation. 
3. The venture’s actual or proposed customer market is (was)                      1   2   3   4   5   6   7  
well known to the corporation based on past sales from  
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